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In January 2009 the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) commissioned the 
Policy Studies Institute to undertake a research project exploring the influence of 
outcome-based contracting (OBC) upon the delivery of Provider-led Pathways to 
Work (PL Pathways), and to address this from the perspective of key stakeholders 
in Jobcentre Plus, the DWP and provider organisations. The research also sought 
to investigate how targets might bear an influence upon the practice of Provider 
Advisers. In addition, it explored how contracting arrangements function at 
present, and also how these might be improved. 
The methodology was qualitative in nature and, across four Jobcentre Plus 
districts, aimed to capture the understandings, interpretations and perspectives of 
the different stakeholders to the programme, including DWP Contract Managers 
(CMs), Jobcentre Plus Third Party Provision Managers (TPPMs), managers and 
advisers from lead provider organisations and managers from subcontracted 
provider organisations. This allowed an examination of the implications of OBC 
for the different stakeholders involved and enabled the research to capture any 
potential tensions and contradictions amongst these different stakeholders, which 
may influence how the programme is delivered. 
The prime provider organisations
Within this research, three of the Prime Provider organisations are private sector 
organisations and one charitable. They are based in a range of predominantly 
urban and more mixed and rural areas. The level of expertise and experience 
required from front-line staff employed by these organisations varied from none 
through to having recruitment agency experience, but common to all but one 
provider organisation was high staff turnover. Providers used a mix of in-house 
and external provision to support client needs. In a ‘black box’ approach to service 
delivery they were required to deliver five Work Focused Interviews (WFIs) for each 
2client as well as provision of a Condition Management Programme (CMP). There 
were four basic models for making service delivery links with other organisations:
1. Subcontracted organisations who provide an ‘end-to-end’ Pathways service 
(i.e. all five WFIs and associated services) for a certain group of clients (either 
those in a particular geographical area or those with a specific health condition). 
2. Organisations contracted to provide specialist services, usually for a particular 
client group, who do not undertake WFIs but provide other support to 
individuals on the Pathways programme. 
3. Service level agreements to refer Pathways clients to partner organisations 
because they deliver a specialist service. In this case, partner providers are not 
paid by the Pathways programme and the service is funded from elsewhere. 
4. Informal referrals and signposting (without formal agreements) to a wide range 
of service providers.
In practice, arrangements were not clear cut and the relationships used by various 
prime providers could overlap across these four models. 
The management of provider-led Pathways contracts
The main way in which DWP CMs monitored the performance of providers was 
through examination of the Management Information (MI) data produced by 
providers on their outcomes, which was measured against contractual targets. Due 
to the under-performance of providers, CMs were no longer expecting original 
profiles to be reached and had often relaxed monitoring against these profiles on 
an informal basis. However, a variety of mechanisms were being used to drive up 
performance quality on a continuous basis, through formal mechanisms such as 
Provider Performance Reviews as well as regular informal communication. 
The DWP contract management framework was felt to provide a useful means 
of standardising the work of CMs across districts/providers and facilitating 
transparency in their role. However, it was not always clear to the different 
stakeholders concerned how responsibility for monitoring provider delivery was 
divided between TPPMs and CMs. TPPMs often felt disempowered in their role 
of monitoring the quality of customer experience on Pathways and generally felt 
that they lacked authority with the provider. TPPMs were developing innovative 
ways of gathering client feedback to monitor quality at the local level but there 
was scope for further development of this. While providers often had their own 
means of collecting client feedback to feed into quality assurance, this was often 
not shared with TPPMs. 
Respondents stressed the importance of regular communication between different 
Pathways stakeholders at the local level in order to improve relationships, break 
down misunderstandings and generally improve the services delivered to clients. 
Provider Engagement Meetings were useful for this purpose. Benefit Delivery 
Summary
3Centre staff, who played a key role in Pathways referral processes, were said to be 
a ‘missing link’ in the early days of the programme, although this had since been 
addressed. However, it was relatively rare for subcontractors and partners of the 
prime provider to be involved in these stakeholder meetings. Some CMs felt that it 
would be appropriate to have more contact at least with those partners delivering 
the end-to-end product for clients who have a share of the outcome targets. 
While there was no great push from the partners themselves to get more involved 
with CMs or TPPMs, some of the experiences they reported in negotiating with 
prime providers suggests that more contact with DWP might be beneficial.
The influence of outcome-based contracting on provider 
organisations
The influence of the outcome-based contract was highly evident in the operations 
and delivery of PL Pathways. All stakeholders felt that the contract was shaping 
the nature and extent of the Pathways support. A division of services emerged 
whereby prime providers served those customers who were considered more likely 
to enter work, while partner agencies attended to the not directly work-related 
needs of customers who were not immediately ready for employment. 
The current economic downturn and resultant decline in job vacancies was 
felt to have exacerbated the financial risks associated with achieving customer 
employment targets. In the current climate the parameters of the contract were 
not considered to be feasible. As providers were not meeting their performance 
targets and service fees were not sufficient to cover running costs, it was widely 
reported that prime and partner delivery organisations were experiencing financial 
strain as a result of the contractual agreements. 
There was little evidence that prime providers were developing in-house provision 
to enhance the quality of customer services. Instead, partner agencies were 
increasingly used to address specialist service needs. Service innovation on the 
part of prime providers was largely focused on reducing operational costs and 
achieving performance efficiencies. 
The influence of outcome-based contracting on front-line 
work with PL Pathways clients
Advisers typically described mandatory clients as difficult to work with because they 
lacked motivation and willingness to engage beyond the bare minimum needed to 
receive incapacity-related benefits. Clients with particular health conditions could 
also be harder to help, including those people with mental health conditions, 
learning difficulties and clients without written or spoken English. On the whole, 
voluntary clients were considered as easier to work with due to their willingness to 
engage in work-related activity. Realistic client work expectations were also seen 
as important. 
Summary
4Traffic light and numerical systems were being used to classify clients in provider 
organisations. Some advisers felt that these systems were rather crude and 
subjective but they were a way of prioritising how much time advisers spent with 
clients as well as shaping action points. Empathy, the ability to motivate, good 
organisational skills and the ability to work under pressure were seen as key skills 
by front-line advisers. Many advisers valued the training they received, but they 
felt that it should be more on-going and there were gaps. 
All prime providers set internal job outcome targets for advisers which had been 
lowered due to the impacts of the recession on their achievability. However, targets 
were still felt to be unrealistic, for example due to the impact of the recession, the 
complexity of client needs and clients lacking motivation. While advisers tended to 
feel that it was important to have job outcome targets, they were also concerned 
that targets did not reflect the varied nature of their roles in working with clients. 
In all areas there was adviser frustration that management pressure to focus 
on job ready clients was leading to less time being spent with clients who are 
further away from work. A strong sense of what needed to be done for business 
survival and job security saw creaming (working intensively with some clients) 
viewed as appropriate behaviour in a target-setting environment. Parking (giving 
other clients a bare minimum of service) was seen as appropriate practice, where 
there was a clear management steer, for disengaged clients lacking in motivation 
and for clients who were seriously ill or awaiting treatment. Advisers therefore 
questioned whether PL Pathways participation was taking place at the right time 
for some of the clients on their caseload, and showed signs of frustration with 
their inability to waive clients. In all areas there was some provision in place for 
clients in need of more help, with signs of prime provider strategies of referring 
these clients for support in the supply chain. There were factors and measures that 
could help advisers to work with clients not labelled as job ready. These included 
adviser motivation and determination to work with all clients and more structural 
factors such as the lightening of administrative duties and good partnerships.
Conclusions and policy implications
While PL Pathways is less prescriptive than Jobcentre Plus Pathways, prime 
providers still felt that the contracts were fairly prescriptive. While in principle 
prime providers had the scope to be innovative in service delivery, they felt that 
they lacked the resources to do much beyond making efficiency savings. This 
research reinforces concern that PL Pathways outcome-based contracts do not 
reflect an expectation that providers will work with the harder to help. There is a 
need for policy to look at a number of areas:
•	 The division of labour across prime providers and the supply chain. Supply chain 
experiences raise a number of concerns, indicative of an imbalance of power in 
prime provider and supply chain relationships.
Summary
5•	 Stronger client feedback mechanisms must surely be a priority given the concerns 
about outcome-based contracts and parking.
•	 The adequacy of PL Pathways resources in a difficult economic climate. This 
raises the broader issue of whether the contracting framework should be more 
tightly linked to wider conditions in the overall economy. Adequate resources 
need to be made available for organisations working with clients with more 
complex needs.
•	 The need to improve administrative processes, including pre-referral health 
assessments, job outcome evidence and monitoring of referral flows. 
•	Whether providers should be paid on the basis of a wider range of outcomes, 
recognising both the nature of client journeys and the nature of the front-line 
adviser role in supporting those journeys.
•	 The potential for differentiated outcomes for groups of customers requires 






1.1 Background to the research
1.1.1 Recent developments in Welfare to Work support for  
 people with health conditions
The Green Paper A new deal for welfare: Empowering people to work which 
was published in January 2006, set out the Government’s aspiration to provide a 
national Pathways service by 2008, to underpin the implementation of the new 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), and to:
•	 help	many	more	incapacity	benefits	customers	into	sustained	work;
•	make	 a	major	 contribution	 to	 the	wider	 aspiration	 to	 help	 a	million	 people	
claiming	incapacity	benefits	off	benefit	by	2015;




A number of changes have already been introduced to these ends. Building upon 
the success of the Jobcentre Plus Pathways pilots which have been running since 
October 2003 and expanded across 40 per cent of the country, Pathways provision 
through delivery by the private and voluntary sectors has been extended across 
the remaining 60 per cent of the country since April 2008. From 27 October 2008, 
ESA was introduced as the replacement benefit for incapacity benefits and Income 
Support on the grounds of incapacity for new customers. The introduction of ESA 
has been accompanied by the introduction of a new Work Capability Assessment 
(WCA) and Work Focused Health Related Assessment (WFHRA) to assess an 
individual’s entitlement to ESA and identify the possible support needed to help 
them get back into the workplace. 
8In February 2008, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) published its 
new commissioning strategy, which has seven components:
1. Market structure: building a stronger, more consistent base of top-tier 
providers who work closely with regional and sub-regional partners.
2. Market development and stewardship: playing an active role in ensuring 
that smaller, local providers who have the capabilities and who perform well, 
can flourish and develop.
3. Provider capabilities: specifying the capabilities and requirements that make 
up a high-performing supply chain and contracting, inspecting, managing and 
intervening on the basis of these capabilities.
4. Commercial strategy: building a competitive market with larger and longer 
contracts, rewarding providers for sustained outcomes and reducing costs, and 
using competition to spur greater effectiveness.
5. Performance management: moving to a single, integrated, shared and 
transparent approach to the measurement and management of provider 
performance.
6. DWP capability: building DWP’s skill base in order to make a positive 
contribution to business partnerships.
7. Customer experience: enhancing the role of customer experience in the 
commissioning, delivery and improvement of provision.
Reform of the contracting process has been a key principle of the welfare reform 
agenda, and this is reflected in the Green Paper In work, better off: Next steps 
to full employment (July 2007), and subsequently the Command Paper Ready for 
Work: Full-time employment in our generation (December 2007). These papers 
signalled the Government’s intention to maximise innovation amongst providers 
and to contract services on the basis of what works, leading to more and better 
outcomes for customers.
1.1.2 Key aspects of outcome-based contracting in PL Pathways
DWP holds outcome-based contracts with private and voluntary providers of 
Pathways to Work. Providers are expected to deliver five Work Focused Interviews 
(WFIs) to clients and have a Condition Management Programme (CMP) in their 
package of services, but they have a degree of flexibility in the other services they 
might offer to meet individual client needs.
Prime providers are paid a service fee for taking referrals from clients on incapacity-
related benefits onto their caseloads. This service fee is worth 30 per cent of 
the contract value and is payable in equal monthly instalments over the life of 
the contract. Further payments to the provider are made on the grounds of job 
outcomes and sustained job outcomes. Profiles for these outcomes were agreed 
with each provider at the start of these contracts, and providers are expected to 
Introduction
9meet monthly targets for both. Different weights are given to job outcomes and 
sustained job outcomes in the contract, as follows:
•	 Job outcome payments are one-off payments made to providers when a 
client referral has resulted in a successful outcome. For example, the client finds 
employment within six weeks of leaving the programme. This accounts for 50 
per cent of the contract.
•	 Sustained job outcome payments are payments to a provider when a 
customer has been in employment for a minimum of 16 hours a week for at 
least 13 of the previous 26 weeks and has generated a job outcome payment 
to the provider. This accounts for 20 per cent of the contract.
1.1.3 The need for research on outcome-based contracting  
 in PL Pathways
Interim findings from the qualitative provider-led Pathways to Work (PL Pathways) 
early implementation study raised a number of points that suggested the need for 
a study of outcome-based contracting (OBC):
•	 Providers	 were	 making	 little	 effort	 to	 work	 with	 ‘harder-to-help’	 claimants,	
choosing to pursue the ‘easier to help’ to meet their job outcome targets.
•	 Provider	advisers	were	finding	many	claimants	with	more	complex	needs	than	
they expected. These advisers also reported their concerns about lacking the 
necessary skills to deal with customers who require intensive support and 
assistance to return to work.
•	 Concern	from	DWP	Contract	Managers	and	Jobcentre	Plus	Third	Party	Provision	
Managers (TPPMs) that the job outcome framework of contracts do not reflect 
an expectation that Providers will work with the harder to help.
The final report reiterated these themes (Nice et al., 2009). A recent rapid evidence 
review of job outcome performance-based contracting, undertaken for the 
DWP, suggests that ‘minimising cream-skimming, creaming and parking is a key 
implementation and management challenge in performance-based and output-
related funding systems’ (Finn, 2009:3). The terms ‘creaming‘ and ‘parking‘ refer, 
respectively, to working intensively with some clients and giving others a bare 
minimum of service.
In theory, outcome-based contracting creates a set of incentives which aim to 
raise performance and provide value for money, whilst encouraging innovation, 
flexibility	and	responsiveness	to	customers	(Finn,	2008;	DWP,	2008).	The	further	
development and refinement of OBC is a key principle in the new Commissioning 
Strategy referred to above. While the contracts for PL Pathways are not subject to 
the new Commissioning Strategy (having been agreed prior to its introduction), 
research findings can provide evidence to feed in to these ongoing developments 
in OBC within DWP. 
Introduction
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1.2 Research aims and questions
The purpose of this research was to explore the influence of OBC upon the delivery 
of PL Pathways, and to address this from the perspective of key stakeholders 
from Jobcentre Plus, the DWP and Pathways provider organisations. The research 
investigated how targets might bear an influence upon the practice of provider 
advisers. In addition, it explored how contracting arrangements function at 
present, and also how these might be improved.
1.3 Summary of research design 
The methodology was qualitative in nature and aimed to capture the 
understandings, interpretations and perspectives of the different stakeholders to 
the programme. These included DWP Contract Managers, Jobcentre Plus Third 
Party Provision Managers, managers and advisers from lead provider organisations 
and managers from subcontracted provider organisations. This allowed an 
examination of the implications of OBC for the different stakeholders involved 
and enabled the research to capture any potential tensions and contradictions 
amongst these different stakeholders, which may influence how the programme 
is delivered. 
The research took place in four single provider PL Pathways areas, including 
two phase one and two phase two districts, with fieldwork taking place with 
multiple stakeholders in each area. The research methods selected were primarily 
one-to-one depth interviews which were preferred to group-based methods 
because of the sensitivity of the issues being explored. Interviews with provider 
advisers were preceded by a workshop to generate issues and develop research 
materials collectively. In addition, the workshops were used to develop vignettes 
(hypothetical scenarios that respondents are asked to comment on and explore) 
that drew on adviser experiences of working with clients.
The research design was iterative, having four stages which fed into each other 
sequentially and several elements within the stages, as shown in Figure 1.1. This 
approach allowed findings from one stage of the research to feed into question 
formulation and instrument development in subsequent phases. See the Appendix 
for the topic guides used at each stage of the research.
Introduction
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Figure 1.1 Iterative research design
The research took place in an increasingly inhospitable economic climate. As the 
research got underway, Bank of England forecasts suggested that the UK economy 
was in recession, raising questions about the challenges faced in generating 
sustainable employment outcomes. Some commentators were arguing that the 
Government needed to take radical steps in the face of rising unemployment (see 
for example, see Simmonds, 2008).
1.4 Report content
Chapter 2 provides a descriptive overview of each prime provider, covering their 
organisational background, PL Pathways structures and client services, including 
the mix of internal and external provision. It also draws out the differences and 
commonalities of the provider organisations and their approaches to the delivery 
of Pathways.
Chapter 3 explores a number of areas in the management of PL Pathways contracts. 
It looks at performance monitoring of the prime providers and supply chain. The 
chapter also takes a close look at the nature and quality of the various stakeholder 
relationships involved in PL Pathways.
Chapter 4 conveys stakeholder views about the contract framework and how 
OBC may have influenced the structure and delivery of PL Pathways. It addresses 
OBC in connection with the financial viability of participating organisations, the 
division of services between prime providers and partner agencies, programme 
administration and service innovation. 
Six key informant interviews
Interviews with four DWP 
CMs and four Jobcentre 
Plus TPPMs (one per area)
Provider Personal  
Adviser design workshop
Contract Manager Feedback Workshop
Interviews with four  
lead provider managers 
(one per area)
Interviews with 14 
subcontractors and 
partners across the area
Interviews with 24  




Chapter 5 takes a closer look at the nature of PL Pathways clients and the 
influence of OBC on the front-line staff working with them in prime provider 
organisations. The chapter includes an examination of the ways in which advisers 
were working intensively with job ready clients (creaming) and giving other clients 
a bare minimum of service (parking) and their feelings about this. 
Chapter 6 reviews stakeholder overall reflections on what was working well and 
not so well in PL Pathways OBC, presenting their suggestions for improvements. 




2 The prime provider  
 organisations
In a ‘black box’ approach to service delivery, prime providers were required to 
deliver five Work Focused Interviews (WFIs) for each client as well as provision of 
a Condition Management Programme (CMP). In the commissioning process, they 
had a degree of freedom to offer (and later develop) other services and also decide 
upon the relative mix of in-house and external delivery. This chapter provides a 
descriptive overview of each prime provider. It paints a pen picture, firstly covering 
their organisational background including funding base, aims and target groups, 
experience of delivering back-to-work help, particularly with clients with health 
conditions. Secondly, it focuses on each organisation’s provider-led Pathways to 
Work (PL Pathways) structures including number of offices, hubs and staff, paying 
special attention to staff recruitment issues and strategies. Thirdly, it looks at how 
client services are delivered including types and mix of service provision and levels 
and types of partnerships formed. Lastly, the chapter draws out the differences 
and commonalities of the provider organisations and their approaches to the 
delivery of Pathways.
2.1 Prime Provider, Area 1
2.1.1 Organisation background
Prime Provider 1 is an international private sector Welfare to Work organisation. 
Historically, its work centred on supporting clients with health barriers to return to 
work, and it has since evolved into an organisation working with the long-term 
unemployed, helping them to make a transition into sustainable employment. 
Since its launch in the UK, in recent years, Prime Provider 1 has been successfully 
delivering government-funded employment programmes. For example, it has run 
Employment Zones (EZs) and the New Deal, and also delivered contracts under the 
European Social Fund project. Its delivery of the Pathways contract can be viewed 
as a return to its historical roots of helping clients with health barriers to return 
to work.
The prime provider organisations
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2.1.2 PL Pathways organisation structures and staffing issues
The organisation is contracted to deliver the Pathways programme in Area 1, 
which is an urban city area. The programme is delivered in several areas of the 
Jobcentre Plus district. In one area there are two offices, one having about 60 per 
cent of the workload and the other, which was opened last year, captures the 
remaining 40 per cent. In terms of staffing, each office is managed by a part-time 
Operations Manager due to the fact that the role is job shared. The rest of the 
staff consists of advisers, administrators and specialist advisers. 
The recruitment process undertaken varied across the different roles. However, 
no experience was required and applicants were taken from a wide range of 
backgrounds, including debt management and Welfare to Work. With respect 
to the key role of the adviser, managers wanted applicants who demonstrated 
such key skills as innovativeness and creativity which they deemed as important 
for working with, and engaging clients with, complex and multiple work barriers. 
Prime Provider 1 has suffered from a variety of staffing issues, primarily of which 
has been a high staff turnover. According to a manager in Prime Provider 1, this 
high turnover has a lot to do with the fact that there was considerable pressure to 
achieve job outcome targets for a vulnerable client group. Advisers were concerned 
that this was being achieved at the cost of some of those vulnerable people. This 
struggle to balance the achievement of job outcomes with the meeting of client 
needs has also proved problematic for the advisers who have remained in the role. 
2.1.3 Client services
A manager described the organisation as ‘very much a work first organisation. 
We are not a training first organisation, we’ve seen far too many clients fall into 
what we call a training cycle basically where they’ll finish one course, not get a job 
at the end of it, start another course etc.’ For Prime Provider 1, the focus of the 
programme is about getting clients back into work and less about offering further 
training which does not support a job outcome.
Clients are offered a tailored employment service designed to meet their needs in 
overcoming barriers to work. This service is carried out by employment advisers who 
deliver a minimum of five WFIs to mandatory clients and support them on a journey 
to work-readiness and eventually return to work. At the WFIs, advisers use a number 
of diagnostic tools to assess clients’ work readiness including their level of motivation 
and a basic needs assessment. If further support is needed regarding English for 
Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) or numeracy, these sessions are given in-house. 
In addition, any clinical specialist support to help the client along their journey to 
work is also offered in-house through the CMP which provides the expertise of a full-
time physiologist and a psychologist. In-work support is also provided for the first 
couple of months after job entry. This concentration of in-house provision has been 
a deliberate strategy by Prime Provider 1, due to quality assurance lessons learned 
from previous New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) contracts. 
The prime provider organisations
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Therefore, Prime Provider 1 only holds Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with 
organisations which provide specialist support which cannot be delivered in-
house. Prime Provider 1 has a successful history of partnership working with these 
specialist intervention organisations. For example, SLAs are held with providers 
of specialist support for people with mental health conditions, and people with 
hearing and visual impairments. 
2.2 Prime Provider 2, Area 2
2.2.1 Organisation background
Prime Provider 2 is one of the largest private sector providers of Welfare to Work 
services in the UK. It has historically delivered employment-related programmes 
but has recently moved to a more mixed service delivery encompassing skills and 
training programmes. The organisation has a long established partnership with 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) on a number of their programmes 
including New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP), NDDP, Pathways, Progress to Work, 
New Deal and Employment Programmes. The organisation also has an established 
history of delivering health-related programmes. However, the delivery of the 
Phase 2 Pathways programme by this provider is new in Area 2.
2.2.2 PL Pathways organisation structures and staffing issues
The organisation is contracted to deliver the Pathways programme in a Jobcentre 
Plus district composed of towns as well as rural expanses. The Pathways team is 
made up of around 30 full-time staff including three performance managers who 
head up three main service delivery sites, tutors who deliver in-house courses, 
employment consultants undertaking front-line work with clients and a provision 
partnership manager. Staff also operate out of several smaller outreach offices. 
Jobcentre Plus premises are also used to meet with clients to increase the extent 
of service delivery across areas some distance from the main sites. 
Recruitment was competency based and key staff, like consultants, were 
drawn from a range of backgrounds. However, some effort was made to draw 
applicants who had existing Welfare to Work, disability, recruitment, and financial 
experience. It was seen as beneficial to service delivery to have this mix of skills 
across advisory staff. However, core training was given to new employees by the 
training department which involved a range of services including induction, health 
and safety and conflict management. In addition, consultant diagnostic training 
was also offered, which concentrated on a number of client diagnostic systems to 
facilitate understanding of clients’ barriers to work. Further training is on-going 
and flexible, the duration of which ranges from a couple of days to a matter of 
months depending on individual needs and backgrounds. Staff retention issues 
have not been notable for Prime Provider 2. However, there have been challenges 
in recruiting specialist staff, e.g. employer solutions tutors, due to low salaries 
offered by Prime Provider 2.
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2.2.3 Client services
A manager in Prime Provider 2 described the organisation’s ultimate aim as being 
to ‘get people into work’ by delivering job broking services. Clients are directed to 
services that will help them to eventually get a job. In keeping with this principle, 
there is little emphasis on training which does not support a job outcome. Clients’ 
barriers to work are assessed through a number of diagnostic tools. Subsequently, 
support on their journey to work is given by way of a minimum of five WFIs with 
employment consultants. Specialist support is provided in-house in such areas as 
job search activity, CV building and writing, and confidence building. Clinical or 
psychological support is provided through the CMP.
The approach of the organisation has been to work in partnership with existing 
provision, i.e. working with other organisations which could support the delivery 
of the programme by providing specialist support to clients. Therefore, SLAs and/
or partnership arrangements are used with organisations which can provide this 
specialist support to clients, and with which Prime Provider 2 already has existing 
links, e.g. Disability Employment Advisers (DEAs) at Jobcentre Plus who support 
clients with more severe disabilities, interpreting support, colleges and training 
providers. Route-ways training is provided by local colleges particularly targeting 
the ’boom’ sectors of care, hospitality and retail. Prime Provider 2 has also 
subcontracted delivery of the CMP to a private sector organisation, as it lacked 
the expertise to deliver this internally. 
2.3 Prime Provider 3, Area 3
2.3.1 Organisation background
Prime Provider 3 is a private, national provider of back-to-work services with a 
history of winning contracts to deliver DWP provision. Working with people with 
disabilities forms part of its remit as a NDDP provider. The organisation has long-
standing relationships with both DWP and Jobcentre Plus. In terms of PL Pathways 
delivery, Prime Provider 3 holds the largest contract of the four providers included 
in this research in terms of monetary value and outcome targets. 
2.3.2 PL Pathways organisation structures and staffing issues
The organisation has a number of main offices across a sizeable geographical 
area including both urban and rural areas. To facilitate service delivery across the 
district, it also has several outreach centres or ‘community locations’ (offering 
limited opening hours). Staff employed in the district total more than 100, 
including area managers who hold overall management responsibility for the 
outreach centres, advisers who provide front-line employment support to clients, 
occupational health professionals who provide physiological support to clients 
and the remaining staff provide administrative support to the programme.
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Large numbers of new staff have joined the provider as part of an ongoing 
recruitment drive to counteract a high staff turnover. Private sector recruitment 
agency experience was preferred as advisers possessing such skills were considered 
more adept at helping clients into employment. Staff undergo considerable amounts 
of procedural and technical training on an automated customer management 
system when they are initially appointed. Subsequent regular training sessions 
update skills and knowledge, ranging from instruction on IT systems or increasing 
awareness of specific health conditions. 
One of Prime Provider 3’s city-based offices found it particularly difficult to recruit 
and retain staff, due to intense competition from other organisations recruiting at 
the same time. In addition, it also lacked key senior management support as the 
role of District Manager was vacant for a few months. These problems resulted in 
increased resources and time being spent on recruitment, training and managing 
large numbers of inexperienced advisers at any one time. 
2.3.3 Client services
The organisation views itself as a specialist in work preparation, and so uses 
external providers to meet a wider range of customer needs in terms of specialist 
support and training. As an established organisation, it utilises an extensive local 
network of contacts in its aim to deliver comprehensive provision for clients.
Prime Provider 3 provides an ‘end-to-end’ service. In-house advisers prepare clients 
for work with five mandatory WFIs. In addition, they also work with voluntary 
client groups, writing CVs, teaching interview skills, interview preparation, and 
skills development, all usually delivered in-house. Where appropriate, some clients 
will be referred by Prime Provider 3 to a partner (external provider) contracted to 
deliver Pathways services. If a client wants a qualification for a specialised job, 
for example, Prime Provider 3 would refer them externally as they do not award 
qualifications or deliver specialist training. 
Four types of contracting arrangements are in place to support clients: a 
subcontract	with	targets	 (typically	 local	council	or	 local	employment	company);	
a	subcontract	without	targets	(typically	with	the	charity	sector;	an	SLA	(typically	
with	a	government-funded	agency	like	Learn	Direct);	lastly,	ad	hoc	local	provision	
to meet specific customer needs. 
2.4 Prime Provider 4, Area 4
2.4.1 Organisation background
Prime Provider 4 is a charity originally specialising in helping people with 
learning difficulties, holding existing contracts for NDDP and Progress to Work. 
An established organisation, its remit has grown to include anyone with health 
problems who is disadvantaged in the labour market. 
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2.4.2 PL Pathways organisation structures and staffing issues
Within what is a predominantly mixed urban and rural geographical area, Prime 
Provider 4 has seven principal offices and 18 outreach sites. The organisation 
consists of District Managers, Area Managers who line manage 12-14 advisers. 
Advisers are divided into General Employment Advisers and specialist advisers who 
provide in-work support. A contact centre deals with the administration including 
making adviser appointments. 
In setting up the programme the organisation had a large-scale recruitment 
drive to attract advisers, including information days which provided details of the 
Pathways programme. Desirable skills included previous experience working on 
similar programmes, being target driven and having knowledge and experience 
of the client group. While sufficient numbers of staff were found to fill the adviser 
posts, questions were raised over the suitability of some following the first round 
of recruitment. Indeed, competition for staff is intensified by organisations with 
larger funding bases situated in a neighbouring major urban area, leaving the 
provider with a pool of advisers without preferable skills and experience (for 
example, in dealing with clients with health complaints). Such challenges coupled 
with a number of advisers being based in more isolated and less supported outreach 
areas resulted in a very high staff turnover. This was the biggest challenge faced at 
the beginning of Prime Provider 4’s contract. By the time this provider participated 
in the research the perception was that it had moved closer to having the right 
mix of staff. Many of the advisers who had left the provider were not well suited 
to their roles.
2.4.3 Client services
The organisation is contracted to provide five WFIs and a CMP for mandatory 
clients as well as provision for voluntary clients. In addition, employment-related 
and specialist support for medical conditions are all offered as part of a range of 
additional services, including motivation and confidence courses, job clubs, social 





2.5 The prime providers compared
Table 2.1 summarises some of the main provider characteristics. Three are private 
sector organisations, one charitable. They are based in a range of predominantly 
urban and more mixed and rural areas. The level of expertise and experience 
required from staff employed in these organisations varies from none required to 
having recruitment agency experience but common to all but one is a high staff 
turnover. Prime Provider 1 focuses on providing its provision in-house whereas 
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the remaining organisations employ more of a mixture of in-house provision and 
external providers. 
The providers have varying mixes of partners and subcontractors and also varying 
arrangements governing the management of these relationships (again see Table 
2.1). At one end of the spectrum Prime Provider 4 has subcontractor agreements 
only while at the other end Prime Provider 1 is not using subcontractors at all. 
There were four basic models for these relationships:
1. Subcontracted organisations which provide an ‘end-to-end’ service (i.e. all five 
WFIs and associated services) for a certain group of clients (either those in a 
particular geographical area or those with a specific health condition). These 
organisations usually have performance targets which are a share of those that 
the prime provider is subject to.
2. Organisations contracted to provide specialist services, usually for a particular 
client group, who do not undertake WFIs but provide other support to 
individuals on the Pathways programme. This might be at particular points in 
the client journey. In these cases, payments and targets are usually based on 
the services delivered rather than outcomes (i.e. serving a certain number of 
clients a month). Sometimes there were additional payments for outcomes.
3. Service Level Agreements to refer Pathways clients to providers because they 
deliver a specialist service. In this case partner providers are not paid by the 
Pathways programme and the service is funded from elsewhere. Typically, this 
would involve Pathways clients using generic provision that is available to other 
eligible clients too. These providers are not subject to targets set by the prime 
provider but may have (outcome) targets from other funding sources.
4. Informal referrals and signposting (without formal agreements) to a wide range 
of service providers.
In practice, arrangements were not clear cut and the relationships used by various 
prime providers could overlap across these four models. In addition, the mix of 
governance arrangements used by prime providers had changed over time in 
response to emerging issues in service delivery and performance.
The basic rationale given by prime providers for working with any partner 
organisations was to provide services for Pathways clients that they themselves 
could not provide. These were often specialist services for clients with particular 
health conditions (e.g. visually impaired, hearing impaired, mental health conditions, 
learning disabilities). Sometimes they were services specifically targeted at less 
work-ready clients, that provided more intensive or longer-lasting support, or in 
other instances were services specific to particular areas of work (e.g. vocational 
training, self-employment support). Other rationales included a political imperative 
to work with other organisations (it was felt that this was expected by DWP) and 
to develop new or reinforce existing partnerships with other local organisations, 
which would be beneficial to the organisation in the long-run.
The prime provider organisations
20
It was also suggested that subcontracting could spread the risk for prime providers. 
This was particularly the case where partners were providing the full ‘end-to-end 
product’ for clients and were responsible for delivering a portion of the outcome 
targets. However, in some cases, this had proved problematic when partner 
organisations were unable to deliver the outcomes expected. In one case, a prime 
provider had rethought its subcontracting strategy as a result of this and had 
decided it was best to take some of the targets back ‘in-house’, and were using 
partners in a different way to provide specialist services. The financial implications 
for organisations of outcome-based contracts is considered in more detail in 
Chapter 4, but first the next chapter considers issues in the management of 
PL Pathways contracts. 
The prime provider organisations































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 The management  
 of PL Pathways contracts
This chapter explores a number of areas in the management of Provider-Led 
Pathways to Work (PL Pathways) contracts. It begins by looking at performance 
monitoring of the providers. This includes a review of issues in the division of 
responsibilities across Contract Managers (CMs) and Third Party Provision 
Managers (TPPMs), the use of outome based targets, Management Information 
(MI) data, Contract Reviews, Quality Assessment and Development Plans, Provider 
Engagement Meetings (PEMs) and the monitoring of customer experience. It then 
explores similar themes in examining the monitoring of the supply chain. Finally, 
the chapter takes a close look at the nature and quality of the various stakeholder 
relationships involved in PL Pathways.
3.1 Performance monitoring of prime providers
3.1.1 The division of responsibilities
The task of managing the PL Pathways contracts lies with CMs who are employed 
by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and based in centralised Supplier 
Relationship Management (SRM) teams, with input from TPPMs, employed by 
Jobcentre Plus, who are based in local districts. The CM is responsible for monitoring 
the performance of the provider against the requirements of the contract, largely 
through monitoring performance against job outcome targets, whilst the TPPM is 
responsible for monitoring the ‘customer journey’. The latter includes a focus on 
operational issues and their associated paperwork, such as referral processes from 
Jobcentre Plus to the provider and sanctions for clients who fail to attend Work 
Focused Interviews (WFIs), as well as the quality of the customer experience on the 
programme. The TPPM also acts as the primary liaison point between the prime 
provider and local Jobcentre Plus staff in the district.
This is a new division of responsibilities, since previously the management of 
providers took place at the local district level, and respective roles and responsibilities 
were still in the process of bedding down at the time of this research. The views 
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of various stakeholders on this division of labour are detailed in Section 3.3. CMs 
reported finding the contract management framework useful for standardising 
their practice within the SRM team, thus resulting in greater transparency in their 
role, for both providers and Jobcentre Plus district staff. However the TPPM role 
and responsibilities appeared to be less clearly defined and there was considerable 
confusion, misunderstandings or disagreements among the various stakeholders 
of what this role entailed.
3.1.2 The use of outcome-based targets
As explained in Chapter 1, the way that outcome-based contracts in PL Pathways 
are structured is that prime providers are paid a ‘service fee’ for taking people onto 
their caseloads (30 per cent of the contract value), supplemented by outcome 
payments for job outcomes (when a client enters paid work of at least eight hours 
a week) and sustained job outcomes (when a client maintains work for 26 weeks). 
Providers are also required to meet monthly targets or ‘profiles’ for job outcomes, 
sustained job outcomes and the numbers of WFIs carried out. While payments 
(per outcome) are standardised across providers, profiles have been individually 
negotiated between providers and DWP.
Accordingly, performance monitoring of providers by CMs is primarily based on 
monitoring the number of job outcomes and sustained job outcomes against the 
profiles that have been agreed in their contracts. Across the board, performance 
in the first year had been poor. The reasons given by providers (which other 
stakeholders concurred with) included, first and foremost, that original profiles 
were over-ambitious, due to a misunderstanding of the nature of the client group. 
Some explained that they had based their assumptions on previous experiences 
with voluntary Incapacity Benefit clients (e.g. through the New Deal for Disabled 
People (NDDP) programme) and had misjudged the job readiness of mandatory 
clients and the extent and complexity of their barriers. This was also felt to have 
been exacerbated by the competitive bidding process, which encouraged providers 
to set unrealistically high targets:
‘With so many different bidders for one contract, everyone is trying to 
outbid each other on numbers and what have you,…so I don’t think it’s at 
all controversial to say that the vast majority of Pathways targets were never 
achievable.’ 
(Prime Provider Manager1) 
The problems were also felt to be compounded by the introduction of the 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) part way through the programme 
(which had altered the nature of referrals), a lower number of voluntary referrals 
than anticipated, and the economic downturn which had resulted in greater 
competition for jobs. In addition to these key factors, administrative problems 
were also felt by some providers to have further hampered their ability to meet 
1 In order to preserve anonymity, area labels are not given for quotations in 
this report.
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their targets. For example, difficulties gathering the evidence for job outcomes, 
problems with administrative and payment flows between providers and the 
Benefit Delivery Centres (BDC), and delays with receiving the outcome of the 
Work Capability Assessment (WCA) meaning that clients are exited from the 
programme after they have already received services.
As a result of these difficulties, various approaches had been taken to the 
monitoring of performance outcomes by individual CMs. In all cases, CMs, as 
well as providers, admitted that original profiles would be unlikely to be achieved. 
Nationally, DWP had made an offer to providers to receive more of the service fee 
for subsequent years upfront, in order to ease immediate cash flow problems, 
but not all providers had taken this up. While some CMs said that they were 
continuing to base their performance monitoring on the original profiles, others 
said that there had been some informal changes2. For example, the focus of 
monitoring had shifted to conversion rates (i.e. the ratio of programme starts 
to job outcomes) rather than the absolute number of job outcomes, and/or that 
the expectation was one of continuous improvement, month on month, rather 
than the achievement of the original profiles. One CM talked about being in the 
process of re-profiling job outcomes across the three years with the provider to 
arrive	at	‘aspirational	targets’	which	were	more	achievable;	performance	would	
then be monitored against the aspirational targets alongside the original profiles. 
One provider also spoke about their own internal monitoring shifting to focus on 
their performance vis-à-vis other providers, rather than the achievement of the 
original profiles.
3.1.3 Use of Management Information
All CMs reported receiving and working with MI data direct from the provider, 
which is measured against target profiles on a monthly basis. In theory, the data can 
be cross-checked against Provider Level Management Information (PLMI) data from 
DWP. However, CMs and TPPMs felt that both sources of data lacked reliability. PLMI 
data consists of performance information sent by providers to DWP’s performance 
management infrastructure suppliers for input into a web tool. CMs and TPPMs 
should, in theory, be able to produce provider performance reports from the web 
tool. CMs and TPPMs suggested that information that they received direct from 
the provider did not tally with information on the web tool. They suggested that 
providers were not meeting deadlines for submitting PLMI data. Such problems led 
some to question whether they were in a position to assess the value for money 
being provided by prime providers delivering Pathways services. 
TPPMs were more likely than CMs to report problems gaining access to and 
utilising MI data. In some cases there was confusion or lack of agreement about 
who needed MI data and why. One TPPM reported that, initially, they had to go 
2 There has not been any steer from DWP’s Delivery or Commercial Employment 
Provision that CMs can adjust the original profiles so these CM accounts 
may reflect an individual interpretation of levels of CM authority.
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to the provider directly for data because the CM was not providing them with it. 
Another CM said that the TPPM did not need access to the data since it was not 
their role to monitor performance. Some providers also commented that it was 
frustrating having to provide data to different stakeholders:
‘It does cause some frustration that DWP are our contractor and yet there 
is an awful lot of demand from Jobcentre for monitoring information and 
stuff like that.’ 
(Prime Provider Manager)
While TPPMs were not responsible for monitoring performance, they needed access 
to performance data in order to understand the quality of referral processes, which 
was within their remit. As part of this remit, TPPMs attempted to check provider 
data on starts against referrals, e.g. by looking at the clerical paper trail, their own 
Labour Market System data on referrals, or against payments data, but this was not 
always easy to do or to understand the reason for discrepancies that were invariably 
found. Some spoke about confusion due to the multiple sources of MI data:
‘There are so many variant sources of information, it’s hard to really gauge 
what is actually happening.’ 
(Third Party Provision Manager)
Most CMs said that there was no MI data available that broke down customers 
according to need or job readiness, and so the MI data could not be used to 
monitor the outcomes according to harder/easier-to-help clients. One CM said 
that outcome data was available from their prime provider organisation by client 
job readiness, based on a traffic light system3, but that it was difficult to track 
client progression using this data. Another felt that this was not part of his remit:
‘I mean they’re not contracted to get red, green, amber people in – it’s just 
people into jobs, to do five WFIs, OK, and hit their targets, that’s all they’re 
contracted to do. I can’t go in there and say, “Let me have a look at your 
red customers, Oh I don’t think they should be in there, they should be in 
there” – This is the black box approach, it’s not for me to say, “This is how 
you should do it”.’ 
(Contract Manager)
Whilst such monitoring of client progression, arguably, falls within the remit of 
TPPMs, who are responsible for the customer journey, TPPMs were generally not 
aware of this data. It therefore seems that there is considerable scope for further 
exploration of the extent to which MI data could be utilised in monitoring client 
progression – and hence the quality of provision – as well as job outcomes.
3 Most providers had traffic light systems using the labels green, amber and 
red to categorise clients’ job readiness. There was also some use of similar 
numerical systems – see Chapter 5.
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3.1.4 Contract Reviews, Quality Assessment and  
 Development Plans
All CMs reported carrying out Provider Performance Reviews (PPRs) once a quarter, 
the frequency of which was based on the high risk rating given to the Pathways 
contracts. In most cases, TPPMs also attended these meetings. One TPPM reported 
that she was initially told not to attend (due to commercial sensitivities) although 
this had subsequently been resolved. All CMs reported additional monitoring 
meetings with providers, approximately once a month, either by phone or face to 
face. Most also had more frequent communication too, usually by phone or email.
Communications between the CM and providers took place with managers at 
different levels in the provider organisations, including with local operations 
managers, regional managers, and centralised staff such as quality performance 
teams and implementation managers. Some CMs noted the benefits of having 
‘high level’ contacts with senior managers in provider organisations. This allowed 
them a central point of access to the organisation for disseminating information 
consistently, but more importantly provided a forum for discussion of experiences 
across the provider organisation, which in most cases within this study, was 
delivering a number of Pathways contracts in different areas. This allowed the 
sharing of good practice and dissemination of solutions to problems more 
effectively across the organisation.
Some stakeholders, mostly TPPMs, questioned whether CMs were ‘hands on 
enough’ (TPPM) in their management of providers. Some CMs stressed that the 
relationship was supposed to be ‘light touch’ (CM). Hence, they relied on TPPMs 
to raise local issues that impacted on performance. In most cases, TPPMs had 
monthly meetings with providers to discuss issues within their remit, namely 
process issues. These meetings could involve provider district managers, as well 
as partnership managers and administrative managers. Issues raised at these 
meetings would then feed into discussions at the quarterly PPR. TPPMs and some 
CMs stressed the importance of this ‘ground-level’ information feeding up into 
assessments of performance. However opinions differed as to whether this was 
happening effectively at the moment. One TPPM commented:
‘[I] don’t feel there’s enough drive there to actually say, “Well, OK, look, you 
know, we said we were doing this, this is how you’re going to do it, this is 
when you’re going to do it, right let’s keep reviewing it”.’ 
(Third Party Provision Manager)
One TPPM referred to issues she had raised with the provider repeatedly ‘falling 
off the agenda’ of meetings. One prime provider district manager also raised a 
concern that local issues were not necessarily feeding up to the CM because 
most of the communication between the provider and the CM took place at the 
national level.
Provider Improvement Plans (PIPs) had been put in place in all provider organisations 
as a result of the PPRs. Examples of actions arising from such plans were 
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staffing changes, such as the appointment of more managerial staff to oversee 
performance, or the creation of specialist adviser posts. One organisation had 
initiated a transformation team to drive up the organisation’s performance.
Some CMs also raised issues about the usefulness of the quality assurance 
framework for ensuring provider quality. Providers complete Quality Assurance 
Questionnaires (QAQs) before each PPR. Both CMs and prime managers reported 
that the paperwork was very time consuming for providers and was felt to duplicate 
the Self Assessment Report return for OFSTED. Some CMs thought that providers 
did not take the assessments seriously. Others felt that what the assessments 
produced are problematic. Two CMs felt that they were not an honest assessment 
of provider strengths and weaknesses but more of a ‘sales pitch’. This may be 
because QAQ ratings feed into star ratings, which providers were concerned 
about. One CM felt that there should be a way for performance data to feed into 
QAQs, which would provide a more nuanced assessment of quality.
3.1.5 Provider Engagement Meetings
Compared to PPRs, the Provider Engagement Meetings (PEMs) were taking longer to 
establish;	in	some	case	study	districts	there	had	only	been	one	meeting	at	the	time	
of the research and in others a meeting had not yet occurred. These meetings were 
also less standardised, since it was up to districts to determine the most suitable 
format. Sometimes the PEMs were contract-specific (e.g. limited to Pathways 
providers) whereas in other districts they were for providers across contracts, and 
might focus on specific issues e.g. Local Employment Partnerships (LEPs).
Contract-specific meetings were generally considered by various stakeholders to 
be the more useful. In districts where PEMs were not contract-specific, separate 
network meetings had been initiated at the local level for different Pathways 
stakeholders to get together. Invitees included the CM, TPPM, prime provider, 
Jobcentre Plus staff and the BDC. In one area, local cluster meetings had also been 
set up between the various stakeholders in different parts of the district. These 
regular multi-stakeholder meetings were thought to be useful to ensure that all 
stakeholders were ‘signed up’ to the same objectives. There were concerns in 
some districts that they had not happened soon enough.
In addition to the national PIPs negotiated between providers and CMs, in many 
cases local action plans had also been developed, arising out of the PEMs or other 
local meetings. These were felt to be useful, and good practice had emerged from 
these, for example improvements to the handover between Jobcentre Plus and 
the providers.
3.1.6 Monitoring customer experience
The ‘black box’ nature of the Pathways contracts, where the services to be delivered 
by providers are not completely specified, means that performance monitoring 
by the CMs focuses primarily on performance in terms of outcomes. Arguably, 
the quality of customer experience falls within the remit of the TPPM who has 
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oversight of the ‘customer journey’, however there was a considerable amount of 
ambiguity around this. A number of TPPMs expressed frustration with their limited 
ability to monitor the quality of the service that prime providers were delivering. 
This was even more the case with the delivery of services by subcontractors and 
partners. Generally, service quality was an element of the performance monitoring 
of providers that was underdeveloped.
One of the principal mechanisms of feedback about service quality used by 
TPPMs was client complaints. Dealing with these fell within the remit of the 
TPPM, unless the complaint raised contractual issues. If complaints were made 
by clients to Jobcentre Plus staff, these would generally be reported to the TPPM 
who would raise them with the provider. If the complaint was a contractual issue 
or it could not be resolved locally, it was escalated to the CM. In the majority of 
cases, this procedure was felt to work satisfactorily, although one CM felt that he 
was being involved in complaints unnecessarily, noting that whether complaints 
raised contractual issues is a matter of interpretation. In a small number of cases, 
TPPMs also reported dissatisfaction that they did not always get feedback from 
the provider on how complaints had been dealt with and/or that they did not get 
to hear about complaints that clients raised directly with the provider.
It was reported that client complaints were more numerous in the early days of the 
programme, and that monitoring these complaints had been helpful in identifying 
shortcomings in programme delivery, such as delays between the Jobcentre 
Plus referral and the first WFI. One CM also noted that he had been able to 
use customer complaints to improve services across provider contracts. However, 
subsequently, client complaints have become less numerous. As a result they are 
seen as having a reduced role to play in monitoring the quality of the customer 
experience. TPPMs are therefore looking for other ways to do this, but these are 
as yet relatively undeveloped.
In general TPPMs expressed some frustration about their limited ability to delve 
inside the ‘black box’ of provider service delivery to assess its quality. While they 
monitored the customer journey via various forms of MI data, it was felt to be 
necessary to also get ‘beneath the statistics’. Some expressed frustration that 
their contact with the provider was limited to meetings with managers and their 
presence in provider offices, where services were delivered, was limited. It was felt 
that to really assess the quality of the service delivered they would need to observe 
interviews and check action plans for clients, but they were hesitant about their 
authority to do this.
Ways of gathering feedback directly from clients on Pathways services were being 
developed by some of the TPPMs, but were generally in their infancy. It was also 
noted that there was limited resource within Third Party Provision teams to carry 
out this work. Two TPPMs reported that they were planning to visit provider offices 
in the near future and collect feedback from customers in face-to-face interviews. 
This was part of a wider initiative to collect feedback on all provider services in 
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the districts. In another district, a questionnaire had been developed for customer 
feedback. This was administered by Jobcentre Plus staff at provider sites or sent 
out by post, although the latter had a low response rate. Feedback from this 
exercise was reported to be largely positive, although one issue raised was the 
representativeness of the results obtained and the problem of reaching those who 
were not actively engaging in the programme.
All provider organisations had some mechanisms for gaining feedback from clients 
on their experiences of services, although in the main these were not very well 
developed. All providers talked about having comments/complaints cards for 
customers to fill in if they wished. Some advisers said that feedback forms would 
occasionally be mailed to customers for completion, or that every once in a while 
there would be a concerted effort to encourage customers to complete them in 
the office, but this was not done systematically. In most cases, forms would be 
collated by managers or a quality team in the provider organisation. In one case, it 
was said that this fed into a quality review on an annual basis, but it was unclear 
if this happened systematically in all providers. Advisers often said that informal 
(face-to-face) feedback from clients was more common than completed feedback 
forms but usually went unrecorded. Written feedback – thanks or complaints – were 
usually passed on to managers and in one case, positive feedback has been written 
up as ‘good news stories’ for the office. Complaints and the provider response 
were also summarised on ‘You said, We did’ posters. One provider reported that 
they conducted an annual customer satisfaction survey. The same provider also 
had a customer service focus group to initiate and drive through improvements for 
customers and had nominated advisers as ‘customer champions’. Similarly, another 
provider had a quality group with adviser representatives, to improve service quality. 
While there was good practice such as this in some areas, there was ambiguity 
regarding how or whether this information should be communicated to the TPPM 
as part and parcel of their role in monitoring the quality of the customer experience.
3.2 Performance monitoring of the supply chain
3.2.1 Division of responsibilities
The contracting model in Pathways, which entails DWP contracting with large 
prime providers who may then subcontract or partner with other organisations, 
as well as the black box nature of service delivery in outcome-based contracts, 
means that DWP and Jobcentre Plus managers have a limited role to play in the 
performance management of subcontractors. Instead, this role is delegated to the 
prime providers. Most stakeholders felt that this division of responsibilities was 
appropriate. However, some CMs felt that prime providers could be ‘more inclusive’ 
with their subcontractors, for example by involving them in PPRs and PEMs, and 
that it might be appropriate for DWP to have a greater role in monitoring the 
quality, especially where those partners were delivering the ‘end-to-end product’:
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‘Where you’ve got a big subcontractor that delivers a big chunk of that 
contract then, you know, the standards between that subcontractor and 
[prime provider] should be very similar – I’m not sure that they are that 
similar [in this case]. But I’ve got no evidence, because like I said we don’t 
get into the nitty gritty of subcontractor delivery.’ 
(Contract Manager)
Some CMs also felt that the prime provider’s management of subcontractors 
could be improved. In some cases this had been discussed as part of provider 
performance reviews and included in improvement plans. In other cases, general 
advice on the management of subcontractors had been discussed with prime 
providers as part of the work of the SRM team.
Given their role in monitoring the customer journey, the quality of services delivered 
by subcontracted or partner organisations could be seen as within the remit of the 
TPPM, but all TPPMs we spoke with said that so far they had no role in this.
The lack of direct contact with DWP or Jobcentre Plus was rarely a complaint made 
by subcontractors or partner organisations. One felt that it would be beneficial 
to attend PPR meetings to hear things ‘from the horse’s mouth’ (subcontractor/
partner), while another felt that it was preferable to deal just with the prime 
provider rather than to multiply the number of people that they were accountable 
to. Nonetheless, whilst there was no great demand for contact with DWP/Jobcentre 
Plus, given that a number of partner organisations did experience difficulties in 
their relationship with the prime provider (as discussed below), some form of 
intervention from DWP could have been beneficial in these cases.
3.2.2 Monitoring arrangements
In cases where partner providers had targets (either outcome- or process-based), 
performance monitoring usually entailed partners sending weekly statistics to the 
prime provider on the number of referrals, fail to attends (if applicable), clients’ 
activities and their outcomes. One prime provider had a web tool that allowed the 
partners to upload their MI data on to their system directly. Beyond the flow of MI 
data, the extent of communication was highly variable, depending on the nature 
of the relationship and whether issues were arising. In some instances there was 
only occasional contact between managers if problems cropped up, in others 
there was almost daily email contact. Partners also referred variously to quarterly, 
bi-monthly, monthly or weekly face-to-face review meetings with prime providers.
Inspection visits to partner premises to observe services and activities were 
sometimes undertaken, often by specialist partnership or contracting teams in 
the prime provider, as part of quality assurance processes, usually at the outset 
of the contract or agreement. In only rare cases were such inspection visits ongoing. 
In addition, visits by the prime provider to partner sites sometimes took place on an 
informal basis, which provided a further opportunity for the prime provider to observe 
activities and speak to partner staff to provide a further check on service quality.
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Where partners were subject to outcome targets, monitoring was generally more 
rigorous. In some cases this had been increased over time as the prime provider 
realised that their monitoring processes were inadequate. Some stakeholders 
suggested that this was a contributory factor in the under-performance of 
partners in the early days of the programme. Supporting this, a number of the 
partner organisations expressed dissatisfaction with aspects of their performance 
management by the prime providers, for example they referred to a lack of 
communication for periods of time resulting from staff turnover at prime 
organisations, or a lack of sharing of performance data from the prime provider 
and other partners.
One subcontractor delivering the end to end process felt that relations had very 
much improved when responsibility for their management had been shifted from 
national to district level, because the extent of communication and support had 
increased dramatically. This relationship showed a number of elements of good 
practice, including joint monthly performance meetings of prime and subcontractor 
managers, development of a subcontractor performance improvement plan, 
quality audits of the subcontractor’s client action plans, regular visits by the 
prime provider to the subcontractor premises and subcontractor access to prime 
provider’s staff development resources (e.g. training). Both the prime provider and 
subcontractor saw the process as one of improving performance in partnership. The 
subcontractor found it particularly beneficial to have access to the prime provider’s 
staff training programme and to learn from experiences and good practice across 
the prime provider’s organisation. Some other partner organisations also referred 
to the benefits that they gained from sharing good practice with prime provider 
organisations at national level, drawing on their experience across contracts.
Front-line staff in prime and partner providers often had good working 
relationships, but this varied depending on the nature of the services provided. 
Prime advisers spoke of receiving regular feedback on individual clients from some 
partner organisations but not others, largely depending on the relationships that 
had been developed. In some instances, partners were delivering services from 
the prime provider’s premises, and in these cases close working relationships had 
usually developed between prime and partner provider staff. Prime advisers often 
expressed more confidence in referring their clients to such services because they 
could be sure about the quality. The importance of prime and partner advisers 
meeting and communicating regularly, in order to improve referrals and ultimately 
provide a better service for the customer, was stressed by many of the stakeholders.
3.2.3 The use of client feedback
Generally, client feedback played a relatively minor role in monitoring the work 
of the partner organisations by the prime providers, although again this varied. 
Gathering feedback from clients was often undertaken by partner providers in 
various different ways as part of their usual operations (aside from Pathways), for 
example through post-activity evaluation forms, surveys or focus groups of users. 
Often this data was used by quality teams to improve services. It was variable, 
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however, whether this data was sought by or shared with prime providers. 
Sometimes this was said to be inappropriate, where Pathways clients were only a 
small proportion of the service users and did not receive a new or different service. 
Where services were developed specifically for Pathways clients, feedback was 
more likely to be shared with prime providers. In one case, both the partner and 
prime provider used a post-activity questionnaire with clients to check the quality 
of the service provided (in this case a training course) and the results were then 
discussed between the two organisations. Changes to the delivery of the course 
were introduced as a result of this exercise.
In many cases, the quality assurance of partner organisations was undertaken by 
specialist partnership or contracting teams in the prime provider, which may or may 
not seek client feedback as part of the quality assurance process. Prime provider 
advisers also received feedback from clients about their experiences of partner 
services which was generally used informally by advisers as a means of guiding 
their decision-making on referrals rather than being collected in a systematic way. 
Sometimes advisers fed the information up to managers to raise with partner 
providers if they felt this to be appropriate.
3.3 Key relationships in contract management
3.3.1 The relationship between providers and CMs
In general, both parties reported that relationships between prime providers 
and CMs were good. One of the consequences of the new structure, with CMs 
positioned in SRM teams, was that CMs had direct links with senior managers in 
provider organisations at the national level. This was seen as useful for improving 
performance because discussions could draw on experience and good practice 
across the organisation as a whole. Moreover, CMs felt that contact with senior 
managers enabled them to exert more influence over provider organisations. CMs 
also felt that the new structure enabled them to develop ongoing relationships 
with organisations which allowed trust to develop, which again facilitated their 
role in improving the organisation’s performance:
‘Where I feel, though, that I bring added value is because of, almost, 
trust, because I’ve worked with the provider, it’s no longer – it’s not a stick 
approach. Yes I can be hard on the provider, but I can also listen to what 
they’re saying…So when you get the provider thinking,…OK, he’s a good 
guy because he listens to us and he’s done something about it…when he 
comes to us and says we’re actually not doing something, then we need to 
take note.’ 
(Contract Manager)
However, some CMs also reported that there were downsides to the ‘light touch’ 
contract	management	 relationship;	being	at	a	greater	distance	and	conducting	
communication remotely could have negative implications for these relationships:
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‘We could be out there a bit more, and you need to be visible a bit more, 
and that’s the way you build those relationships. It’s difficult to build that 
relationship over the phone, which – that’s one of the issues.’ 
(Contract Manager)
By and large providers echoed this assessment and reported that their relationships 
with CMs were good. One summarised the relationship as ‘really responsive 
and really supportive’ (Prime Provider Manager). Another spoke of working 
in partnership with the CM to raise performance. Providers also viewed the 
relationship with CMs as useful for a potential point of influence over DWP policy 
around Pathways and/or contracting processes generally.
3.3.2 The relationship between CMs and TPPMs
Relationships between CMs and TPPMs were more variable than those between 
CMs and providers. Some relationships were good and described as ‘helpful’ and 
‘supportive’. One CM had organised regular meetings of TPPMs working with the 
same provider across districts to share experiences, which was viewed positively 
by the parties concerned.
However, some respondents, both CMs and TPPMs, reported tensions in 
relationships (drawing on their own or others’ experiences). Some CMs felt that 
TPPMs were too demanding of providers and felt that they were over-stepping 
their responsibilities:
‘I think they bang the drum because they’re the face-to-face…they’re dealing 
with them on a day-to-day basis, but officially they should be dealing with 
me.’ 
(Contract Manager)
Some CMs also spoke of acting as an arbiter in disputes between the provider and 
the TPPM, and this was also reported by providers, who had found the CM to be 
supportive in this respect.
TPPMs, on the other hand, felt frustrated that they did not have sufficient authority 
over the provider and that the CM was not always responsive to the issues that 
they were raising:
‘The Third Party Manager kind of sits in the middle and just acts as a liaison, 
so you’ve got, you know, you’ve got the provider, you’ve got Contract 
Managers, you’ve got job centres, and you’re kind of sitting in the middle of 
all of that and just making sure things are running smoothly, so you’re kind 
of, you’re having to almost take day to day responsibility, but you haven’t 
actually got the overall control, if you like, and you couldn’t enforce anything 
with a provider.’ 
(Third Party Provision Manager)
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3.3.3 The relationship between providers and Jobcentre Plus
Third Party Provision Managers
Relationships between the TPPM and the prime provider organisations were 
also of variable quality. Some providers felt that the TPPM was overzealous in its 
demands for information from the provider and were concerned about ‘having two 
masters’ (Prime Provider Manager). While some providers acknowledged that this 
local level monitoring was helpful, others felt that it was sometimes unnecessary 
and speculated that it could be politically motivated. Equally, some TPPMs felt that 
providers were unwilling to engage and did not view the relationship in the spirit 
of partnership. One described the provider as ‘very closed’ (TPPM).
Comments from CMs confirmed the tensions in provider – TPPM relationships. 
One referred to the relationship as ‘a bit fraught at times’ (CM), and some felt that 
TPPM staff were finding it ‘hard to let go’ (CM) as they were formerly responsible 
for the contract management of providers.
However in many cases, the relationship was a good one, and most providers 
felt that the TPPM played a positive role in bringing together local stakeholders 
including the BDC, who were often seen as a major stumbling block to the 
smooth administration of referral processes (see below). They were also credited 
with sharing information about employers with providers, for example about LEPs 
and large recruitment events.
The quality of relationships could be affected by the amount of time that both 
parties were able to spend on developing the relationship. In one case study 
district, the relationship had suffered, seemingly, due to changes in staffing at the 
provider organisation which meant that communication was irregular. Likewise, 
turnover	in	the	TPPM	role	affected	relationships;	new	TPPMs	in	two	of	the	case	
study areas were still ‘getting to grips’ with the role at the time of the fieldwork. 
In one area, the provider raised concerns that the TPPM, who was new to the 
post, had insufficient authority within the district to resolve the issues that they 
were facing, for example, working with the BDC staff. In another case, concerns 
were raised that the TPPM was increasingly being pulled away from her role on 
Pathways due to high claimant numbers. Regular communication between the 
parties concerned was seen as the key to developing good relationships.
Local Jobcentre Plus office staff
Relationships between Jobcentre Plus and the prime providers at the level of front-
line staff were varied and differed according to the local context, even within a 
single district. Relations had also evolved over time and had generally improved. 
Some provider staff (advisers and managers) commented that there was initial 
(sometimes ongoing) hostility from Jobcentre Plus staff and they had to work hard 
to break down barriers:
‘The jobcentre seem to have this opinion about Pathways because it’s like 
their job being taken away from them, and they’re not willing to help.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
The management of PL Pathways contracts
36
Equally, some TPPMs reported an unwillingness to communicate and co-operate 
on the part of provider staff, for example failing to turn up when shared events 
had been organised.
Despite this, there were many examples of good practice where the two sets of 
advisers were working together. Examples include:
•	 prime	advisers	working	from	Jobcentre	Plus	offices	at	regular	intervals;
•	 Jobcentre	Plus	advisers	delivering	initial	client	interviews	at	provider	offices;
•	 case	 conferencing	 between	 provider	 advisers	 and	 Jobcentre	 Plus	 Disability	






Such joint activities were universally felt to be beneficial, both to dispel 
misunderstandings and negative perceptions among advisers, and to improve 
service quality for customers, by developing ‘a seamless service’ (TPPM) between 
the two organisations.
A number of suggestions were made for greater partnership working between 
Jobcentre Plus and prime advisers, including case conferencing for individual 
customers and conducting joint trigger WFIs to increase the number of voluntary 
referrals to Pathways provision. The barriers to closer communication and co-
operation between advisers included the current pressures on Jobcentre Plus staff 
due to higher claimant numbers as a result of the recession. This limited the extent 
to which provider advisers could co-locate in Jobcentre Plus offices because of the 
pressure on office space.
Benefit Delivery Centre
Relationships between providers and the BDCs, which play a key role in referral 
processes, were often experienced negatively by provider staff. Specific complaints 
were that BDC staff did not pass notifications to providers when customers had 
changed their contact details or had left the programme. Some felt that BDC 
staff were not involved at an early enough stage in the Pathways programme and 
that consequently they were unaware of the provider and/or Pathways referral 
processes. This has been addressed to a large extent by including BDC staff in 
PEMs and other local meetings. However, there were still complaints from some 
providers that it was difficult to communicate with BDC staff and/or that they 
were unco-operative.
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3.3.4 The relationship between different providers
There were various DWP/Jobcentre Plus initiatives to bring different Pathways 
providers together to share experience and good practice. In some areas, there 
were regular regional events organised for all Pathways providers (i.e. both 
PL Pathways and Jobcentre Plus-led programmes). Some CMs expressed frustration, 
though, that provider networking events did not encourage the sharing of good 
practice between organisations because they saw themselves as in competition 
for DWP contracts.
Prime providers also organised various networking events for their partners. In 
one area, a networking event for all the prime provider’s partner organisations 
(across contracts) was held monthly, which was thought to be useful for sharing 
experience and good practice. Some partner providers also found it helpful to be 
able to access information and good practice from across different districts and 
contracts, through their relationship with the prime provider.
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4 Influence of outcome- 
 based contracting on  
 provider operations
This chapter conveys stakeholder views about the contract framework and how the 
outcome-based contract may have influenced the structure and delivery of Provider-
led Pathways to Work (PL Pathways). It addresses outcome-based contracting 
(OBC) in connection with the financial viability of participating organisations, the 
division of services between prime providers and partner agencies, programme 
administration and service innovation. 
4.1 The business case for entering into an OBC
As noted in Chapter 1, OBC creates a set of incentives which aim to raise 
performance and provide value for money, whilst encouraging innovation, flexibility 
and responsiveness to customers. The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
holds outcome-based contracts with private providers of Pathways to Work. In 
addition to the 30 per cent service charge which is payable in equal monthly 
instalments over the life of the contract, payments are made on the grounds of 
job outcomes and sustained job outcomes.
Perhaps due to the advantage of hindsight, none of the stakeholders who were 
interviewed explicitly mentioned the fiscal benefits of signing up to a large scale, 
outcome-based contract for delivering Pathways services. These discussions 
were overshadowed by topics related to the recession and cash flow issues (see 
Section 4.2.1). Instead, respondents, particularly prime providers, presented a 
more cautious view about entering into a contract that was heavily weighted on 
customer employment targets. For example, one respondent favoured a system 
that paid for services rendered and felt this would alleviate the financial pressures 
attributed to the outcome-based contract: 
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‘I would much prefer it to be more weighted on a service fee and then if it 
was deemed that you were not hitting where you needed to be, that it was 
then clawed back…I’m sure you’ll be aware it’s caused huge problems with 
a lot of the smaller organisations from a point of view of cash flow.’ 
(Prime provider)
Echoing the fiscal risk to the organisation, one respondent from a partner agency 
felt a contract based on job outcomes would not be economically feasible because 
it would not recognise the resource intensity of the specialist service they provide. 
Providers (both prime and partner) also mentioned more strategic rationales for 
entering into the Pathways contract: corporate responsibility and enhancing 
the	 public	 profile	 of	 the	 organisation;	 a	 mission	 to	 improve	 the	 employability	
of	 disadvantaged	 workers;	 diversifying	 existing	 services	 for	 a	 specialist	 group;	
building	capacity	in	another	service	market,	and;	diversifying	funding	sources	for	
existing services. 
In terms of employment service delivery, some respondents acknowledged that a 
fee structure tied to job outcomes was an efficient way of focusing operations. 
The targets could also serve as a useful measure for comparing the performance 
of the different prime contractors. For example: 
‘The good things about outcome funding is you’re very focused on hitting 
those outcomes, so therefore you’re very targeted. Your staff understand. 
The staff are very targeted about what we need to achieve in performance. 
So there is a clear steer on where you’re going…I do think that it’s good to 
be able to over-achieve on the outcome contracts and the targets, and [for 
DWP] to know the good performers and the good providers.’ 
(Prime Provider Manager)
4.1.1 Financial viability
The financial risk associated with the outcome-based contract was the issue most 
often cited by respondents. The framework was described as ‘a very challenging 
contract’ and ‘extremely difficult from a cash flow perspective’. In addition, 
initial projections on customer profiles were considered unrealistic for meeting 
performance targets and the service fee portion of the contract did not cover 
operation overheads, even after renegotiation of payment schedules. 
The prospect of not meeting the contracted targets would result in a devaluing of 
the contract and a reduction in any profit to the provider. Respondents from both 
the commissioning and contracting sides affirmed that providers had experienced 
a financial loss. Prime providers, and some of the partner agencies, reported that 
their Pathways operations were being subsidised with revenue from other service 
contracts and funding streams. Providers with a higher turnover were better 
equipped to absorb the financial loss associated with delivering Pathways. 
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The economic recession appeared to be adding to the strain. A reduction in job 
vacancies had rendered the assumptions underpinning the performance targets 
unrealistic. Performance was also jeopardised by employers not committing to 
permanent work placements or to jobs that would extend beyond 13 weeks. 
Furthermore, Pathways customers who were seeking work were facing tough 
competition with the higher volumes of Jobseeker‘s Allowance claimants, many 
of whom possessed a work history that was more attractive to employers. As one 
respondent explained:
‘…we are dealing with people with sometimes up to 20 years’ unemployment 
so they are going to be sitting along newly redundant people for the jobs that 
they’re going for. I do believe that we can overcome it but it is a challenge 
that is greater than we realised when the contract started…I suppose it’s just 
come back to the fact that we weren’t anticipating such high numbers of 
clients to be so long term unemployed…’ 
(Prime Provider Manager)
Some partners were reconsidering the feasibility of their continued involvement 
in Pathways. It was also observed that other partners across the PL Pathways 
network had already pulled out of subcontracts and service level agreements 
due to the financial burden of delivering Pathways under the agreed terms. One 
national organisation that had been providing specialist services under a combined 
service fee and outcome-based subcontract felt the terms were unrealistic. It 
was the agency’s preference that the partnership be redefined so that the prime 
contractor would only buy-in services as and when needed. Contract terms had 
been renegotiated for some of the partner agencies, recognising the unrealistic 
expectations about performance measures contained in the original agreements. 
One agency noted that a change to their service agreement was necessary not 
only for their business but also for the viability of the Pathways partnership: 
‘…there is a lot of responsibility on the prime contractors because the way 
they manage the contract and the kind of framework they set up can impact 
on their partner’s ability to deliver and I think that needs to be a shared 
responsibility.’ 
(Partner Provider)
In addition to the economic downturn, respondents outlined a number of 
other factors that influenced their performance and posed as challenges to the 
financial feasibility of the outcome-based contracts. In hindsight, prime providers 
and contract managers noted that the time and intensity of customer support 
required were stretching service efficiencies. It was felt that the job readiness of 
customers had been overestimated and the difficulty of engaging customers in 
job preparation services had been underestimated. In a similar vein, the volume 
of volunteer customers, those considered to be closer to the labour market, 
was lower than expected and, in some cases, customer support needs were not 
revealed until later adviser meetings, thus protracting the service process. Delays 
in receiving results from the Work Capability Assessments (WCAs) could also result 
in lost time serving a customer who is not eligible for Pathways. 
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Staff turnover (management and service delivery staff) and the time needed to 
train and establish new staff resulted in breakdowns in delivery partnerships and 
disrupted service delivery. It was also noted that in rural areas, travel distances for 
outreach activities would increase costs to the provider and acted as a disincentive to 
customers who would forego the benefits of the service if it was not offered locally. 
4.1.2 Length of contract
It was a commonly shared view by all stakeholder groups that the three-year 
contract held by the prime providers was not sufficiently long enough. It was felt 
providers needed time to develop and establish the new Pathways services, in 
conjunction with their network of partners. Start-up delays also created waiting 
lists for services and this backlog of customers needed to be attended to before 
services were deemed to be running at an ‘optimal’ level. Given the time needed 
to establish a new programme of services, one respondent suggested that a five 
to seven year contract might be more realistic: 
‘…if it’s something new like Pathways was…it takes them three, four, five 
months to get off the ground and get everything running how they would 
like it to be. They then spend the next few months catching up…it would 
be nice if they had that little bit longer so they could work, you know get 
something in place for the first year, eighteen months and then work with 
it, so I think five possibly seven [years] would be better.’ 
(Contract Manager)
It was also argued that a longer contract made good economic sense on the 
commissioning side, requiring less staff resources to administer and manage. For 
providers, a longer contract would provide greater staff security which would 
translate into more continuity in services and organisational relationships. 
4.2 OBC and service delivery
It was strongly felt by respondents from all stakeholder groups that the structures 
of remuneration-focused programme services on the end performance targets 
for	which	prime	providers	were	being	financially	rewarded;	 in	other	words,	 job	
starts and job sustainability. Outcome-based funding was described as setting the 
business operating model and, put bluntly, the fee structures were said to ‘shape’ 
and ‘breed’ behaviour. 
Delivering a programme to serve all customers was described as a ‘fine balance’ 
between: a) empathising with customer needs and brokering services to meet 
those	needs;	 and	b)	 attending	 to	 employment	 targets	 and	 focusing	 customers	
on the path to work. To address this, prime providers tended to supply job 
preparation services in-house and broker the non-work-related support to outside 
agencies who had already developed these services and had experience of the 
customer group (e.g., needs related to sensory impairment, English for Speakers 
of Other Languages, mental health, learning difficulties). This division of services 
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was justified on both financial and pragmatic grounds: 
‘If it’s an outcome-based funding, your service is about getting your 
outcomes which is about moving people off benefit and into work. So you 
are going to concentrate all your funding and all your efforts in moving 
people into work…if somebody is further away from the job market, what 
you have to do, and what the advisers are trained to do, is to signpost 
and link in with other organisations that can support that customer…People 
have specialisms, and you can’t be everything to everybody who walks in 
the door.’ 
(Prime Provider Manager)
The main driver for the division between prime provider and partner delivered 
Pathways services was considered to be the fees structure and the fact that there 
was no premium associated with serving specialist needs. As noted by one partner 
provider:
‘…there’s no incentive for [prime provider] or any other Pathways providers, 
certainly financial incentives, to deal with our clients…I think that’s the irony 
of prime contractors who in their original bid say, ”Yes, we can deal with 
every disability group”, then of course will levitate towards the people closer 
to the labour market.’ 
(Partner Provider)
There was some variation in the amount and level of non-work-related services 
that were delivered by prime providers, depending on the organisational skills base. 
Partner agencies were also brought into prime provider premises in order to supply 
more of a seamless service for customers who needed the extra support. As seen 
in Chapter 3, there were some Third Party Provision Manager (TPPM) concerns 
around quality management of the supply chain when clients were referred to 
specialist services (see Section 3.1.6).
To some extent, a focus on end results detracted from other intermediary services 
that did not directly lead to a customer taking up employment. Some prime providers 
recognised there were other services which would benefit their customers, such 
as paying for training fees, financial management and debt advice, but they could 
not justify the costs because those services did not directly relate to job outcome 
targets. As one respondent stated: 
‘It’s definitely changed the model because you have to focus the activity on 
the things that are definitely going to get you some income. So there would 
be a lot of additional stuff that I would have liked to have delivered for the 
customers that would enhance their customer journey, definitely, but that 
doesn’t get me any income.’ 
(Prime Provider Manager)
As the contracts near their end, it was anticipated by at least one respondent that 
income needs would intensify pressure on prime providers to channel resources to 
the more job ready customers. 
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4.2.1 Views of partner providers
A minority of prime provider organisations were setting outcome targets for their 
partner providers. Some partners were finding it difficult to meet these targets. 
The reasons given for this were similar to those given by the prime providers for 
not achieving their targets (see Section 3.1.2). However, in addition, a number 
of the partner providers said that they were not getting the referrals that were 
anticipated from the prime provider, either in terms of overall numbers or in terms 
of the nature of the clients. Several partner organisations commented that they felt 
the prime provider was ‘cherry picking’ those clients who were the most job ready 
and only referring clients who were less likely to find work in the short run. This 
impacted on their ability to meet their job outcome targets. It was reported by one 
partner agency that was experiencing a financial loss that they were considering 
cost cutting measures that would affect their Pathways-related services. 
As a result of this, in a number of cases, prime provider and partner organisations 
had often renegotiated (or were in the process of doing so) the original terms 
of the contract. This usually took the form of revising the monthly profiles for 
job outcomes, and in some cases the balance between service fee and outcome 
fees had been renegotiated. Some partners were resisting demands from prime 
providers to reduce their fees. In some cases, negotiations had been successful, 
however, there were also a number of cases where partners had decided to pull 
out of contracts, sometimes reverting to a more informal referral arrangement 
where outcome targets were not involved.
Those partner agencies without job outcome targets did not report the same level 
of pressure to meet targets as reported by the prime providers. Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that respondents from these partner agencies reported no change in 
the range and intensity of services they provide. 
4.3 OBC and service administration
All prime providers felt that the paperwork and IT data entry required for processing 
customers through Pathways was an arduous task. Providers were required to 
follow existing procedures set by Jobcentre Plus and the Benefit Delivery Centre 
(BDC) to track customers through the programme. It was generally felt that 
administrative time was not adequately budgeted or resourced. 
The requirements of OBC significantly added to the workload of prime providers 
and, to a lesser extent, the partner agencies, depending on the nature of the 
contract or service level agreement. The main area of contention was the 
requirement for Pathways providers to submit evidence of a job outcome before 
payment was received. This requirement also directly involved employers who 
ultimately submitted the evidence of the job start. Employers were not always 
forthcoming with the evidence which resulted in providers devoting more time to 
follow-up requests and sometimes strained employer relations. Difficulties were 
also associated with producing evidence of a self-employment job outcome. 
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When it was an adviser’s responsibility to produce evidence of a job start it was felt 
that the time needed for this was detracting from productive time with customers, 
for example:
‘So I will do the paper chase and I will run around and try and get the outcomes, 
but that’s another thing that stops me helping people as well, because all I’m 
doing is chasing paper. It’s not doing what you should be doing.’
(Prime Provider Adviser)
Overall, prime providers were concerned that customer employment was being 
undercounted due to the rigid procedures required for crediting a job outcome. 
Ultimately, this was undermining their record of performance. 
4.4 OBC and service innovation
Within the parameters of the Pathways Work Focused Interviews (WFIs) and a 
Condition Management Programme (CMP) framework, prime providers, with 
their partners, were granted the flexibility to develop a programme of services that 
could respond to local customer needs. Often described as a ‘black box’ approach, 
it was entirely up to the contractor to design a programme of work-related services 
and supports (in-house and out-sourced) that would address customer needs and, 
ultimately, move people into work. 
As noted in earlier research (Nice et al., 2009), PL Pathways services took time to 
develop and mature. This was connected to the time needed to develop experience 
of	Pathways	 customers;	gain	knowledge	of	 the	 various	needs	of	 the	 customer	
group and awareness of service agencies that can help address these needs. All 
respondents in the current research commented on the protracted process of 
service learning. As described in Chapter 2, prime providers often already delivered 
a similar range of work preparation services, such as Job Clubs, CV preparation 
and job interview coaching. To enhance the customer journey, some providers 
developed other services to encourage peer support (e.g., workshops for sharing 
job search experiences) and activities to promote health and well-being (e.g., gym 
memberships, walking group, Tai Chi). 
However, innovation in customer services was arguably limited. Respondents 
representing the various stakeholder groups pointed out that innovation is tied to 
extra resources and, in the current economic climate, most prime providers were 
not in a position to spend on extra services for customers:
‘…if [providers] are now scratching around for outcomes then they’ve not 
got the resources to do over and above…they’re not going to be able to 
put extra staff in or do different things that cost them additional resources 
if they haven’t got those resources coming in in the first place…in this sort 
of economic climate they’ve got to look at their own balance sheets and 
balance their investment against their income.’ 
(Contract Manager)
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Some partners who signed up to an outcome-based agreement concurred that 
a limited cash flow was constraining their approach to service delivery, as one 
subcontractor noted: 
‘…you haven’t got the money to be innovative. You’ve got to go with what’s 
tried and tested ‘cause you can’t afford to risk any cash or any funding on 
something that you don’t know is going to work or not.’ 
(Subcontractor)
It was evident that prime providers were increasingly relying on their partner 
agencies to supply services to customers who were less job ready, preferring to 
invest time in those who are going to contribute to job outcomes. One prime 
provider justified this strategy on the grounds that specialist partners had the 
capacity and the financial resources to support these customers: 
‘…as part of our innovation. If somebody has a specific need that’s really 
going to help them move into work, then, obviously, that’s something that 
we would fund. But some of the general stuff, for people who are much 
further away, we look for other organisations who’ve already pulled funding 
down to deliver that and pick it up a bit once they’ve done that initial bit.’ 
(Prime Provider Manager)
It was also noted out that service innovation was limited to economies of scale, as 
extra services would need to help a relatively large cohort of clients into work to 
justify the expenditure. 
Not all prime providers in the study were credited with developing innovative 
approaches to programme delivery. Some of this was attributed to the Pathways 
regime. One respondent considered the current set number of WFIs as too 
regimented and process driven to allow much room for innovative practices: 
‘…the five WFI system is extremely rigid and there is so little flexibility around 
it that to have innovation within such a tight structure is very hard.’ 
(Prime Provider Manager)
Past experience with the New Deal for Disabled People was also a reason given for 
a lack of service innovation on PL Pathways. In this case, providers were seen to be 
delivering services that had been developed previously. 
4.4.1 Efficiency measures
For the most part, innovation of programme delivery was tied to seeking out 
efficiencies for meeting contractual targets. As providers entered the second year 
of their contracts with little improvement in securing income from job placements, 
innovation strategies became increasingly linked to improving their performance. 
In response, all prime contractors had installed quality assurance and performance 
improvement plans to address performance issues. These resulted in a variety of 
changes to operations and delivery procedures. For example, various amendments 
were made to the process of delivering WFIs. High fail to attend rates were 
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redressed with group warm-up sessions before the first WFI and double booking 
WFI appointments. The duration of WFIs was adjusted so that less time was 
allocated for customers who were unlikely to participate in a job search and some 
of the responsibility for delivering WFIs was subcontracted to a partner agency. To 
cope with higher caseloads one adviser reported that their employer had started 
to conduct WFIs in a group format4. Explaining the introduction of group WFIs, 
this adviser stated:
‘…our…. advisers who currently have an insanely high caseload and have 
started conducting group WFIs, so sometimes 10 clients at a time have an 
hour’s appointment and it’s more like a workshop than a work focused 
interview. And then they hand them over [to another team of advisers] as 
they get more job ready’. 
(Prime Provider Adviser) 
Other actions intended to improve performance included:
•	 the	development	of	different	methods	for	identifying	customer	work	readiness,	






•	 identifying	 a	 market	 sector	 with	 job	 vacancies	 and	 supplying	 relevant	 skills	
training	to	improve	customers’	chances	of	filling	the	vacancies;	
•	 reinforcing	 staff	 and	 customer	 behaviours	 that	 contribute	 to	 performance	
targets. For example, some office staff were rewarded (e.g., gifts, money) for 
reaching	targets.	Customers	received	monetary	incentives	to	reward	a	job	start;	
customers who submitted a job application or CV to a prospective employer 
were eligible to enter a weekly draw for a gift voucher. 
4 Technically group WFIs should not be occurring and may reflect a 
misinterpretation of what working practices are allowed. Alternatively, the 
adviser may be confusing group WFIs with group warm-up sessions.
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5 The influence of outcome- 
 based contracting on  
 front-line work with PL  
 Pathways clients 
One of the concerns raised about outcome-based payment systems is that they 
may provider greater incentives for ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’, ‘where providers 
work most with those who are easily placed and provide a minimal service to 
the harder to help’ (Finn, 2009: 12-13). This chapter takes a closer look at the 
nature of Provider-led Pathways to Work (PL Pathways) clients and the influence 
of outcome-based contracting (OBC) on the front-line staff working with them in 
prime provider organisations. It examines client barriers to work and staff views on 
the characteristics of clients who are easier and harder to work with, in so doing 
considering issues in client journeys through PL Pathways. Adviser perceptions of 
the key skills in supporting clients and adequacy of their training are reviewed. The 
chapter then turns to an examination of the use of targets and other management 
tools in the supervision and monitoring of front-line staff. The chapter finally turns 
to an examination of the ways in which advisers were working intensively with 
job ready clients (creaming) and giving other clients a bare minimum of service 
(parking) and their feelings about this. 
5.1 Client barriers to work and views on clients who are 
 easier and harder to work with
5.1.1 Barriers to work
Advisers often described a continuum of client support needs. Client attitudes 
were often presented as a barrier to work, advisers typically describing mandatory 
clients as difficult to work with because they lacked motivation and willingness to 
do more than they needed to receive incapacity-related benefits. Clients with a 
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history of cycling between different benefits were also part of this group. Advisers 
spoke of clients lacking confidence and also questioning whether it was the right 
time for them to be participating in PL Pathways. Other clients were felt to be 
challenging to work with because they had unrealistic job expectations or were 
older men in their 50s with physical health conditions who had not worked for 
several years. 
Advisers often described people with mental health conditions as a difficult group 
to work with. For example, one adviser, in discussing how targets were initially 
unrealistic for this group, noted that ‘It can take six to eight months to convince 
them that they could make a transition into employment‘. There were also issues 
around the suitability of the workplace and the recession making it even more 
difficult to work with employers to promote job entries. 
In addition, ethnic minority groups were sometimes felt to be difficult to work 
with, with advisers describing cultural barriers that needed to be overcome. For 
example, Muslim/Arab women who had never been employed, who had culturally 
had a focus on domestic work in the household, and did not speak English. People 
with severe learning difficulties were also seen as a challenging group to work 
with. 
On the whole, voluntary clients were seen as easier to work with due to their being 
keen to engage in work-related activities, in order to take steps into employment. 
But, as will be explored below, there were also other reasons. Clients were 
also easier to work with if they had realistic expectations about engaging in PL 
Pathways and future work or had been on benefit for no more than one year and 
were ‘more eager to get back to work‘ (Adviser). The following kind of comment 
was made by several advisers, though advisers could feel constrained in taking this 
approach if clients were not classified as job ready:
‘If somebody’s suffering and wants to work, and actually not being at work 
is making them uneasy and unhappy, there’s a green light, and I will pull out 
every stop. They’re the easiest ones.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
5.1.2 Classification systems
As touched on briefly in Chapter 3, traffic light systems for the classification of 
clients were widely used across the providers, with the following categories:
•	 Red	–	clients	who	were	described	as	 ‘non-movers’,	who	were	some	distance	
away from being ready to move into employment.
•	 Amber	–	clients	who	were	‘on	a	journey’,	needing	to	take	several	steps	before	
being ready for employment.
•	 Green	–	clients	who	were	ready	for	work.
Two prime providers had numerical systems for classifying clients. One provider had 
a system whereby they numbered clients ‘one to five’. Running this system in parallel 
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with a traffic light system, ‘one’ signified a job ready client while ‘five’ signified 
the hardest to help group of clients. Another provider took a similar approach but 
used the numbers ‘one to four’ in order to classify clients. The extent and nature 
of work that advisers did with clients was influenced by their classification as easier 
or harder to help. There were criticisms of these kind of classifications and some 
advisers baulked against them, as the following comments illustrate:
‘It’s a very primitive form of trying to get human beings into classifications 
and boxes, which never really is accurate.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser describing numerical and traffic light system)
 
‘You could have somebody that’s really job-ready, got lots of experience, 
could walk into a job tomorrow if they wanted to, but if they don’t have 
the right attitude they could have as many interviews as they liked but they 
might not necessarily pass them. There is always going to be an element 
of categorization when you’re working with large numbers of people, but 
for me personally my time is better invested for those that want it and can 
benefit from it.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
As the above quotations imply, traffic light classifications were not necessarily 
felt to correspond with job readiness. Some advisers explained how they tried to 
distinguish the extent to which they could help a client, which often depended on 
the client’s willingness to engage and move towards work, which is not necessarily 
the same as their distance from the labour market or the complexity of their needs 
and/or health conditions.
Despite these issues, the traffic light system and its numerical equivalents were 
described as a way of prioritising how much time advisers spent with clients as 
well as a way of shaping adviser action points in working with clients, for example, 
green or one clients being worked with more intensively or passed onto colleagues 
working in a job brokerage role. Clients labelled as amber were channelled into 
various forms of support to help them get more job ready, for example Condition 
Management Programmes. As is explored further below, clients labelled as red 
were often given a bare minimum of service.
5.2 Key skills and the adequacy of training for  
 front-line staff 
Advisers were asked what they felt were the key skills that an adviser needed to 
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•	 the	ability	to	work	under	pressure.
Other desirable skills were felt to be a good knowledge of the benefits system. 
The importance of a solid knowledge base was also described as being important 
to truly be able to provide equality of opportunity and service to clients. It was 
important to have not only knowledge of service provision but also the range of 
clients that an adviser had to work with. 
There were advisers in all four areas with concerns about the adequacy of 
training. While many valued the training they had received, with prime providers 
delivering a range of induction programmes on arrival and varying degrees of 
follow-up provision (see Chapter 2), some felt that they did not have a sufficient 
understanding of a range of health conditions, for example working with people 
with severe learning difficulties or mental health conditions. While some advisers 
did feel comfortable working with these health conditions because of their 
backgrounds, others sometimes keenly felt the absence of training around how 
to work with such client groups, including access to support services. 
Some advisers wanted to receive more training in their roles. Some questioned their 
employers’ commitment to on-going professional development in an environment 
where so much emphasis was being placed on job outcomes and processes that 
were ostensibly geared towards achieving them.
Over time management have also given a steer on styles of working. For example, 
in one area front-line staff are encouraged to challenge customer motivation and 
build confidence regarding work after previously being perceived as being too 
‘health focused’ in their advice. This kind of shift reflects prime provider emphasis 
on working with job ready clients as will be explored further below.
5.3 The use of targets and other approaches in the  
 supervision and monitoring of front-line staff 
5.3.1 Use of targets
As seen in Chapter 2, it was common for the prime providers to recruit front-
line advisers from private sector recruitment backgrounds. Many of these recruits 
were familiar with working in a targeted environment and saw the importance 
of targets. Advisers from Welfare to Work type backgrounds also felt that targets 
were important in ensuring that mainstream employment outcomes were secured 
for client groups on incapacity-related benefits:
‘What you’re getting is an outcome for people going into work…Now in 
some ways, that is quite liberating for somebody that’s from a background 
of, well we can put you on training, I can put you on literacy and numeracy 
and we can do a bit of job search with you, and we’ll do you some training 
on personal and social skills and well if you get a job it’s like a by product. So 
it’s quite liberating to say, “yes, want to do training? You can do training in 
your own time but I am here to focus on getting you right for work. What 
do you need, what can we give you to support you within Pathways?”.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
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All four providers had introduced individual job outcome targets for their advisers. 
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed how, in the context of rising unemployment, providers 
across the areas had been struggling to achieve job outcome targets. There were 
reports, at the provider manager and front-line adviser level, of advisers feeling 
demoralised because they found these targets unrealistic. 






As implied in Chapter 4, the recession was affecting adviser achievement of 
targets via a number of routes. Advisers reported that rising unemployment had 
increased employers’ expectations of the extent of job readiness required for entry 
level jobs. Moreover, recession had made client perceptions of their job prospects 
deteriorate creating a further barrier that needed to be engaged with to facilitate 
a movement into employment. The following comment was typical:
‘…people are getting laid off left, right and centre. How am I supposed to 
get that person a job when they’ve also got a gap in their CV ‘cause they’ve 
been ill for whatever reason?’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
There was also a degree of adviser frustration that targets did not recognise that 
clients could have high support needs or fluctuating health conditions that meant 
that they could be: ‘job ready one minute and just not ready to engage the next’ 
(Adviser). Clients lacking in motivation was a recurring theme as the following 
adviser conveyed:
‘…the targets are unrealistic because pushing many of these clients into 
work is really, really difficult. I’ve got clients whom I’ve seen even 10 times 
and they think,”no, why are you still calling me, I don’t want to come and 
do“, no matter how many times you show them how good it is, actually, to 
get back into work.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
However, a high degree of client motivation did not mean that a client would be 
able to sustain their employment. There were concerns about a high number of 
clients not being able to sustain employment because of their health conditions. 
In particular, people with mental health conditions were described as lacking 
confidence in making an into-work transition. There were adviser concerns that 
these clients were not receiving the support that they needed to make a sustained 
transition into employment. Understaffing, a particular issue in one of the areas, 
could also limit adviser time working with clients to secure a job outcome.
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The prime provider response to the internal job outcome targets for advisers 
becoming unachievable was to reduce them. Lowering of internal adviser targets 
took place across all prime provider organisations and these changes were 
universally	welcomed	by	front-line	staff;	albeit	that	some	were	still	struggling	to	
meet the reduced targets. 
There was some concern amongst advisers that targets did not sufficiently reflect 








unfair that they could fail to achieve these targets when clients failed to attend 
meetings for reasons beyond the adviser’s control.
5.3.2 Management support and case reviews
On the whole advisers had good relationships with their immediate line managers, 
valuing the empathy that they seemed to convey with the pressures of everyday 
working life as a front-line adviser. There were some signs that advisers felt that 
senior management were remote and lacked both awareness of and interest in 
the pressures that advisers were working under. This theme was more pronounced 
in some areas than others with signs from adviser accounts that this was linked to 
management style. Case reviews were common across all providers though their 
format varied. The typical model was that immediate line managers conducted 
monthly performance reviews with individual advisers. In one area these one-to-
one reviews were supplemented by monthly group meetings, while in another 
area advisers, who were organised into teams, met in these teams in order to 
review cases. Advisers felt that team working helped facilitate the exchange of 
ideas. Sometimes Jobcentre Plus advisers also attended these team meetings.
5.3.3 Observation
There were signs that one-to-one line management observation of adviser conduct 
of WFIs was valued in all areas, though the extensiveness of this practice varied. 
Across two providers a line manager observes adviser WFIs on a regular basis, 
feeding back on performance. This practice tended to take place monthly or every 
six weeks and advisers seemed to appreciate the support this feedback provided 
for their interactions with clients:
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“…when I first started, as I said, you were kind of left to your own devices 
a little bit, and at first I wondered, “am I asking the right things? Should I 
be saying this to this person?”, but now because we get shadowed on our 
interviews, at least you know that you are saying the right things and you’re 
doing the right things.‘ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
In one area observation had been part of adviser support practice but had lapsed, 
but there were plans to start them up again while in another area observation was 
about to begin.
In one of the areas a line manager also did spot checks on action plans, feeding 
back on what information should be included in the action plan, given to the 
client and key areas of action plan strength and potential for improvement.
5.3.4 Peer support
Advisers spoke favourably of the support that they receive from their peers, both 
in scheduled team meetings and during the working day. Office meetings took 
place at a regular time each week. They involved front-line advisers and their team 
leaders. It was not always easy to get all advisers together for these meetings 
because of the variable timing of their work commitments as explained by the 
following adviser who commented that: 
‘…because of the nature of this job it’s really hard to get everyone together 
at the same time.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
Nevertheless, and despite the emphasis on individual targets, there were signs of 
team spirit, for example one adviser taking on some of the workload of a colleague 
who was feeling ‘really low‘ as he did not have time to do his administrative tasks. 
5.4 Targets and front-line adviser working practices: the  
 duration and intensity of adviser contact with clients
5.4.1 Caseloads and client contact
Reflecting the drive for job outcomes, which seemed to be shaping developments 
in	working	practices;	 in	 two	areas	 the	amount	of	 time	that	advisers	spent	 in	a	
Work Focused Interview (WFI) with a client had been reduced. In one area advisers 
had been spending half an hour with clients for each WFI but had been told to 
spend no more than 15 minutes with them. In the other area the working rule 
was that the first WFI should be quite lengthy, while the further four should be 
no more than 20 minutes long. The underlying philosophy of this approach was 
that the more clients that advisers could see the more they would get into work. 
However, there was adviser concern that 20 minutes was not enough time to get 
to know a person and ‘build trust’ with them. A related theme here was that the 
balance of helping and caring and profit sharing must be right. 
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The quality of referrals being received by advisers was being affected by delays in 
the administration of new health assessment processes for Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) claimants as well as the quality of those assessments. The delays 
often meant that advisers would invest time and effort in supporting clients before it 
became known that they were ineligible for the benefit and therefore, the Pathways 
programme. Pressures on the amount of time that could be spent with eligible 
participants were therefore exacerbated. 
There were some signs that pressure to get clients into work could mean that 
some advisers did a bit too much for green clients, potentially not maximising the 
scope to improve their self-reliance in volatile labour markets, as explained by the 
following adviser:
‘…you’ll have some advisers that will do 100 applications a day for their 
clients but that’s what they’re doing, they’re doing them for them as opposed 
to empowering them to do it themselves.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
Advisers occasionally referred to not having enough front-line staff, describing how 
not achieving targets had knock-on effects for the prospects of staff recruitment:
‘So it’s, kind of, turned into a Catch 22 situation, we’re never going to reach 
targets because of the extra work load put on us, so there’s not enough 
staff. Literally there’s not having targets, just leads to having no staff again 
so, nothing can be done’. 
(Prime Provider Adviser) 
5.4.2 Creaming practices
Targets and the intensity of adviser work with clients
As evidence in the previous chapter implied, more intensive working with 
green clients was a common experience for advisers across all prime provider 
organisations. The following adviser graphically described how he had noticed a 
change in emphasis in the provider that he worked for:
‘…there has been a massive shift from actually working with our client 
group, working with a caseload of clients and moving everyone closer to 
almost creaming the top off and working with them and processing the less 
ready clients, I would say.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
While there was some concern that this led to a focus on clients who might get a 
job without assistance, advisers tended to acknowledge the support needs of job 
ready clients. There was a feeling that clients who were making a transition into 
employment often needed an intensive period of support to do this effectively. 
Not only did adviser support help to boost the confidence of the job ready and 
build trust with clients, it also helped to achieve sustainable job outcomes from 
green and, with more time, amber clients. Length of time out of work could 
further increase the need for support:
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‘If a client’s ready to go into work, you should be working more with them 
and more intensely with them, because that gives them the right support, 
especially people who haven’t worked for a long time, you need to make 
sure that you are supporting them all day because that’s what’s going to get 
them the job. To keep saying “I know it’s tough but keep going, you will get 
a job”.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
There was some discussion of a desire for more motivated green clients, who 
many saw as ‘good quality voluntary referrals‘ needing relatively little support to 
move into employment, for example those who had a job held open for them to 
return to. The heterogeneous nature of the voluntary client group was recognised 
in adviser perceptions of voluntary clients. This ranged from those who would 
need more time to become job ready but were highly motivated, to others who 
consistently failed to follow up on action points to the occasional ‘time waster‘ 
who just want to engage with PL Pathways to ‘pass the time‘. 
Issues of business survival and job security were also linked to a job ready focus. 
These concerns were, to varying degrees, held by many advisers. The way in which 
they could help underpin a focus on job ready clients is apparent in the following 
quotations:
‘…if we don’t get our target we lose our job, because if we don’t get our 
target the company fails.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
 
‘Because of the targets that we have, you can’t waste your time on customers 
that are not moving…Your tick box customers that you know for a fact 
are going through the motions, they’re either rude or say they’ve got no 
intention of returning back to work, you know, see them on one day and 
get them all out the way for that Work Focused Interview.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
Concerns about the implications for job security of not achieving targets seemed 
to be fuelled by the management of probationary periods. This theme was 
particularly evident in one area where advisers had either been faced with the 
threat of having, or have had their probation extended.
Concerns about the influence of a job ready focus
A strong sense of what needed to be done for business survival and job security 
meant that many advisers (and their senior managers) saw creaming as appropriate 
behaviour in a target-setting environment. Parameters within which advisers 
had to work were being set by senior managers. While advisers were very clear 
on the pressure that they were under to work with green clients, the extent to 
which advisers felt that a focus on green clients was appropriate or inappropriate 
behaviour was a grey area. There were signs of adviser concern that their potential 
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work with clients who needed a lot more help was being compromised, as with 
the following adviser who described a colleague who was seen by management 
as a strong performer but whose selective engagement with clients he saw as 
unethical:
‘I watch him working and see a difference in the way that he will, depending 
on the opening gambit of the customer, to how he actually deals with the 
rest of the interview. If he feels there’s no outcome coming in the next 
month, he won’t even bother having anything, engaging properly with 
them. It’s just, like, get out the door as quick as possible.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
While all providers had Adviser Discretion Funds, their use was limited and some 
managers seemed to be discouraging advisers from using them at least in part 
due to the inhospitable economic environment for placing clients into jobs and 
generating income.
5.4.3 Parking practices
Views on parking as appropriate behaviour
The accounts of advisers’ experience of working with clients suggest that there 
were circumstances in which giving clients a bare minimum of service was seen as 





Some of these circumstances are indicative of advisers, as well as clients, 
questioning whether the PL Pathways referral had come at the right time for 
them. The capacity of advisers to waive clients was removed with the introduction 
of ESA from October 2008. However, some advisers showed signs of frustration 
with their inability to waive clients for whom they felt PL Pathways provision was, 
and would continue to be, inappropriate. The following quotation is illustrative:
‘There are some that I might go through the motions with because they’re 
so ill that they really shouldn’t be with us. In my opinion they’re never going 
to be able to return to work, they might have umpteen ailments from heart 
disease to COPD [Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease], emphysema, 
there’s no cure, there’s no recovery, you know, they’re so ill at the minute 
that they can’t work, there is no next step, is there? I know it sounds very 
negative but something like emphysema it’s downhill from here on, there is 
no recovery.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
The influence of outcome-based contracting on front-line work with PL Pathways clients
59
The experiences of clients who need a lot of help
In all areas there was some provision in place for clients in need of a lot more 
help to make a transition into employment (red clients). In other words, they were 
not a completely neglected group. However, there were concerns about whether 
there was organisational capacity, including adviser skills, to work with clients who 
have challenging support needs. People with mental health conditions, severely 
disabled people and Asian women with ESOL needs who had never worked were 
all amongst the groups that providers were not geared up to work with. Having 
said this, there were signs that advisers were referring clients on to organisations 
that could support them, though this was not always an easy process. Sometimes 
there were area gaps in the kinds of agencies that might be helpful for clients or, 
as with the following adviser, there was a lack of awareness of agencies:
‘We can refer people to those and obviously if we just focus on a specific 
type of support, we’d be neglecting the majority, so I think that’s potentially 
sometimes frustrating. There’s Remploy for example that we work with 
closely. There’s the Disability Employment Adviser at the Job Centre and 
sometimes it’s just knowing when you can’t give somebody the type of 
support they need, but simply knowing who you can refer them to’. 
(Prime Provider Adviser) 
Other support gaps included clients with drug and alcohol problems and people 
with mental health conditions. 
Factors that help advisers work with red clients
There were factors on an individual adviser level and on a more structural 
institutional level that allowed advisers to work with red clients. On an individual 
level, advisers could be highly motivated to do their best for clients. They could 
decide to prioritise working with red clients, sometimes hiding their efforts from 
management, rather than the target pressures to work with green clients. At a 










clients on to additional support.
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Some advisers made the more general point that some clients needed an holistic 
approach from an adviser able to understand and take into account their health 
condition and how this might be managed in the workplace as well as providing 
guidance on a CV and how to be successful in an interview. Support from referral 
agencies also needed to be built in. One or two advisers pointed out that it was 
still early days for the PL Pathways contracts and these issues were being looked 
at. Neverthelessn there was recognition of the constraints:
‘…I think given that the client group that we’re dealing with a lot of them 
are those are going to need long-term support. I mean management do 
address that they will always ask who’s coming forward, those clients that 
are further away from work what are you doing to move them forward, so 
it is addressed, but I think the very nature of it being outcome-based means 
that getting jobs on the board is always going to be a priority.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
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6 Conclusions and policy  
 implications
6.1 Main themes in stakeholder reflections on PL  
 Pathways services and outcome-based contracting 
6.1.1 What was working well?
The main areas that the research respondents emphasised to be working well 
were the support offered to the Provider-led Pathways to Work (PL Pathways) 
client group and PL Pathways stakeholder relationships.
Support for the client group (some, not all)
Respondents, across the range of stakeholders participating in the research, 
identified the support given to the client group as the successful element of the 
programme. They reported that clients who felt motivated to work seemed to 
value receiving support away from the jobcentre, although there were concerns 
about the support available for the broader range of clients. 
Stakeholder relationships (some, not all)
In most of the areas, Contract Managers (CMs), subcontractors and partners felt 
that they had developed good working relationships with the prime providers. 
Subcontractors and other partners discussed initial uncertainty about how their 
partnerships with prime providers would work which fuelled low expectations of the 
relationships. Therefore, where prime provider partnerships with subcontractors/
other partners were working well this tended to take the latter by surprise as was 
the case with the following subcontractor:
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‘I think to be honest it’s a bit more than what we expected, because when 
they first come in it was like “Okay, how can we work in partnership?”, and 
it probably didn’t take a bit of a while to get it up and running, the links are 
there, we know the advisers that are down there by name to name basis, 
so the partnership working is really working and we’re hoping that that will 
continue and increase really.’ 
(Subcontractor)
As seen in Chapter 3 not all stakeholder relationships were working well, for 
example that between CMs and Third Party Provision Managers (TPPMs). 
Respondents stressed the importance of regular communication between different 
Pathways stakeholders at the local level in order to improve relationships, break 
down misunderstandings and generally improve the services delivered to clients. 
6.1.2 What was not working well?
Respondents raised concerns in three main areas, all of which made delivering 
services in an OBC framework difficult: 
•	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 processes	 involved	 in	 delivering	 Pathways	 services,	




Process issues – referrals
Chapter 5 highlighted the impact of the delays in the administration of the 
new Work Capability Assessment (WCA) process for Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) claimants. Advisers (and their managers) questioned the 
usefulness of Work Focused Health Related Assessments (WFHRAs) as an indicator 
of a client’s readiness to work. They felt that these process issues were a drain 
on the time they had to work with clients and generate job outcomes in a high 
pressure environment. 
Process issues – job evidence
Difficulties in securing evidence of job outcomes, required by providers to receive 
payment	 for	 supporting	 clients	 into	 work,	 was	 a	 wide	 source	 of	 frustration;	
particularly for provider staff but also for some of the Jobcentre Plus and 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) staff supporting them. There was also 
some frustration that sustained job outcomes could not be obtained for clients 
entering employment for less than 16 hours per week.
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The use of targets in the management of front-line staff
As emphasised in Chapter 5, advisers were broadly in favour of having job outcome 
targets. However, there were some concerns about the pressure to achieve targets 
at the cost of an acceptable quality of service to clients. The majority can be seen 
as the ‘struggling adviser’, trying to maintain a balance of providing a good service 
to clients as well as achieving targets. There were a minority of advisers who 
enjoyed	and	achieved	targets;	the	‘target	driven	adviser’;	and	there	was	a	further	
minority who chose to ignore targets and concentrate on progressing the client.
Meeting the needs of clients
The evidence from this research reinforces findings from the qualitative PL Pathways 
early implementation study (Nice et al., 2009) that Providers were making little 
effort to work with ‘harder to help’ claimants, choosing to pursue the ‘easier to 
help’ to meet their job outcome targets.
This needs to be understood in the context of how the introduction of ESA has 
altered the PL Pathways client caseload and therefore clients are generally ‘harder 
to help’, often having complex barriers to work. Clients who are ineligible for ESA 
are those that would be easier to work with. Providers found it was difficult to meet 
the needs of the unexpectedly high proportion of clients with complex barriers 
to work. Problems with the new WCA intensified the challenges that providers 
faced in working with clients and meeting their needs. Respondents discussed 
inappropriate referrals in terms of clients not being referred to PL Pathways at the 
right time, as explained by the following adviser:
‘I think that the big issues again going back to whether the clients that 
are referred over to us are appropriate. If those clients have gone through 
the correct process, the clients that we see here, should be right to come 
and see us and invite to the programme. The fact is that they are coming 
through too fast and that’s where the problem lies, and that’s why we’re 
sometimes struggling to address things that we shouldn’t have to address.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
Contract managers, provider managers and front-line advisers felt that there was 
a real lack of provider knowledge of the client group which impacted on the 
delivery of the programme. Those clients with greater support needs appeared to 
be being referred on to partner agencies. It was these agencies which seemed to 
be attending to most non-work-related needs of clients who were not immediately 
ready for employment. 
The broader contractual framework with DWP
While PL Pathways contracts are less prescriptive about service delivery than 
Jobcentre Plus Pathways, prime providers still felt that the contracts were fairly 
prescriptive. This was reflected in the stipulation that five Work Focused Interviews 
(WFIs) should be carried out with mandatory clients and the need to provide a 
Condition Management Programme (CMP). While in principle prime providers had 
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the scope to be innovative in service delivery beyond such basic elements, they 
lacked the resources to do much beyond making efficiency savings. Reflecting 
this, although all providers had Adviser Discretion Funds their use was limited. 
Some managers seemed to be actively discouraging advisers from awarding these 
funds to clients in order to save on costs in a context where they were struggling 
to generate income through job outcomes. 
6.2 Discussion and policy implications
6.2.1 The division of labour across prime providers and the  
 supply chain
One of the drivers for this research was concern from DWP CMs and Jobcentre 
Plus TPPMs that the job outcome framework of contracts does not reflect an 
expectation that providers will work with the harder to help (Nice et al., 2009). 
Evidence from this study reinforces this theme. All stakeholders felt that the 
contract was shaping the nature and extent of the Pathways support made 
available to clients. The common prime provider strategy was, broadly speaking, 
to focus on job ready clients and encourage supply chain focus on clients requiring 
more intensive support and assistance to return to work. On the one hand this 
kind of division of labour is a cogent strategy. On the other hand, supply chain 
experiences raise a number of concerns. 
Subcontractors wanted to have more flexibility in the contracts and have reviews 
built in. In particular, some expressed a desire for the financial terms of the contract 
to be reviewed to make it more feasible for them to work with a lower than expected 
volume of referrals. They were also frustrated at experiences of prime provider 
cherry picking of clients and there was some demand to have a much broader 
range of clients referred to them, not only those in greater need of support. At the 
heart of this were these organisations’ own concerns in achieving job outcomes 
and being financially viable. One suggestion for improvement was to have a more 
participatory contract design and this reflected an imbalance of power in prime 
provider and supply chain relationships. This arguably needs to be addressed.
Part of the flexibility in service delivery that prime providers do have is in forming 
relationships with other agencies to meet client needs. Several partners felt that 
they were subsidising a major government initiative in their Pathways role. Arguably, 
without these formal and informal partnerships clients with greater support needs 
would have a greater support gap than they do at present. However, monitoring 
arrangements for the supply chain seem to vary widely. This is a source for concern 
given	prime	provider	strategies	 for	delivering	support	 for	non-job	ready	clients;	
that is the fragmentation of programme responsibility across multiple providers. 
Generally, client feedback played a relatively minor role in monitoring the work of 
the supply chain. Given the concerns about incentive-based contracts and parking 
raised in this report and elsewhere (see Finn, 2008, 2009), strong client feedback 
mechanisms must surely be a priority.
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6.2.2 The adequacy of resources
The adequacy of resources that providers have access to under the OBC framework 
needs to be examined. Providers (both prime and subcontractors in the supply chain) 
felt that their Pathways contracts were tightly funded and contracts insufficiently 
long. The economic downturn and resultant decline in job vacancies had no doubt 
exacerbated the financial risks associated with achieving employment targets. In 
the current climate the parameters of the contract were not considered to be 
feasible. As providers were not meeting their performance targets and service 
fees were not sufficient to cover running costs, it was widely reported that prime 
and partner delivery organisations were experiencing financial strain as a result 
of the contractual agreements. With provider organisations increasingly reliant 
on partner agencies to address specialist service needs, service innovation on 
the part of prime providers was largely focused on reducing operational costs 
and achieving performance efficiencies. This raises the issue of whether the 
contracting framework should be more tightly linked to wider conditions in the 
overall economy. 
Some respondents in the supply chain conveyed how a focus on job ready clients 
was sometimes being passed onto them (in contrast to those who felt that prime 
providers were keeping job ready clients to themselves). Their reflections on the 
effectiveness of Pathways conveyed a desire for more resources for clients with 
more intensive support needs. As they argued, if prime providers are going to 
focus on working with less job ready clients, adequate resources need to be made 
available to organisations working with clients who have more complex needs. 
6.2.3 Improving administrative processes
Improving a number of administrative processes would contribute to the more 
effective operation of OBC. Prime providers clearly identified where improvements 




off-benefit checks as standard practice where job evidence is unavailable is a 
possible solution worthy of exploration. This would involve conducting a check 
that clients were no longer claiming benefit and taking this as reliable evidence 
of	a	job	outcome;
•	 a	 need	 for	 the	 monitoring	 of	 referral	 flows,	 having	 this	 data	 more	 readily	
available being likely to facilitate improved provider planning. 
These issues were recognised by DWP and Jobcentre Plus stakeholders, some of 
whom were pushing for them to be explored at a more national level.
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6.2.4 Exploring other approaches to outcome-based contracting 
To reiterate, this research reinforces the conclusions of other assessments: that 
OBC can lead to perverse incentives (Finn, 2008, 2009). A key issue is whether 
OBC might be modified to support more desirable behaviours, thus providing 
incentives to support, in practice, the contractual expectation that providers 
should be working with the harder to help. Suggestions for doing this include: 
(a)	paying	providers	on	the	basis	of	a	wider	range	of	outcomes;	and	(b)	deploying	
differentiated outcomes for groups of clients.
Paying providers on the basis of a wider range of outcomes
Many provider advisers, and some of their managers and stakeholders in the 
supply chain, were very supportive of greater recognition of soft outcomes in any 
future OBC framework. As seen in the previous chapter, while some front-line 
advisers had multiple targets to meet, they did not feel that DWP contract and 
payment structures were sensitive to qualitative aspects of the nature of their role 
and the realities of supporting many clients into employment. An aspect of this 
was the time that it could take for clients to really take ownership of a possible 
into-work transition (see Chapter 5). Indeed, the pressure to get clients into work 
could mean that a focus on building client skills could be compromised.
Qualitative outcomes achieved by clients who are some way off from getting 
a job include, for example, an increase in self-esteem or self-confidence that 
improves the quality of their everyday life even it does not make them job ready. 
There are also other outcomes that it is perhaps easier to measure, for example 
completion of a training course, entering voluntary work or completing a work 
trial. These may also have a positive influence on self-esteem and self-confidence. 
For example, there was some discussion of older Asian women who have never 
worked being helped to acknowledge that raising a family entails many skills and 
being encouraged to undertake training courses or do voluntary work: 
‘I’ve had one lady who’s teaching the Koran to young children at a local 
volunteer centre. Because maybe the types of work that they want to do 
aren’t necessarily out there, they tend to be voluntary-type jobs, I mean 
even working in a nursery or something like that. If it’s someone who has 
ESOL needs for example, in my view they can only work with Arab children, 
so they would undertake some sort of actual activity that they weren’t 
necessarily doing before. So it’s certainly becoming more active but in more 
of a voluntary capacity.’ 
(Prime Provider Adviser)
Similar arguments were made by some advisers about the value of therapeutic 
work for people with learning difficulties and severe mental health conditions. 
While there is a state aspiration for people on incapacity-related benefit to be 
included in policy goals of full employment and ‘work first’ (see for example, DWP, 
2007), a moot point is whether voluntary and permitted work activities should be 
valued as the completion of a journey in itself for some members of disadvantaged 
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groups (i.e. those covered by Public Service Agreement 16) or should be seen as a 
stepping stone to mainstream employment.
The DWP’s new Commissioning Strategy (DWP, 2008) seeks to promote the further 
development and refinement of OBC. For example, there are plans to develop and 
test new sorts of outcome targets, such as longer-term sustainable work outcomes, 
outcomes that reward work progression or the acquisition of skills. While the 
contracts for PL Pathways are not subject to the new Commissioning Strategy, the 
research findings suggest that movement in this direction would be regarded as 
a positive development by a range of stakeholders in PL Pathways. The present 
balance between voluntary and mandatory participation in PL Pathways beyond 
five WFIs also needs to be reviewed. There is mixed evidence from this research on 
the desirability of the greater conditionality advocated in the Gregg report (Gregg, 
2008). Many front-line advisers and their managers were frustrated that some 
mandatory clients displayed minimal commitment to engaging with provision and, 
implicitly,	fulfilling	their	potential;	albeit	that	there	were	also	issues	of	clients	not	
engaging at the right time (in terms of their health condition). However, they also 
tended to emphasise how genuine client motivation and willingness to engage 
made them easier to work with in PL Pathways (see Chapter 5). 
Differentiated outcomes for groups of customers
In the light of wider policy discussion of the merit of differentiated outcomes for 
groups of customers based on their distance from the labour market and the 
obstacles they face (for an earlier discussion see Finn, 2008), respondents were 
asked for their views on alternative contracting models. The Escalator Funding 
Model was used as a means of illustration and was defined as the idea that 
providers are paid lower outcome payments for more job ready clients and higher 
payments for less job ready clients. 
While respondents felt that this sounded like a good idea in theory, they felt 
there were two main practical problems: One was the thorny issue of who would 
categorise clients into easier and harder to help. The second issue raised was 
concern that labelling clients as harder to help was a discriminatory practice, in that 
clients already struggling with self-confidence, self-esteem could feel demoralised 
and demotivated by this label. Providers’ traffic light systems for classifying clients 
were not made known to clients and one might argue that an Escalator Funding 
Model could be used discreetly. However, the challenges associated with an 
Escalator Funding Model should not be underestimated. As seen in Chapter 5, 
traffic light classifications did not necessarily correspond with job readiness. Some 
advisers tried to distinguish the extent to which they could help a client, which 
often depended on the client’s willingness to engage and move towards work, 
which is not necessarily the same as their distance from the labour market or the 
complexity of their needs and health conditions.
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Qualitative study exploring the influence of outcome  
based contracting in Provider-led Pathways to Work
Key informant topic guide
The purpose of the interviews
As part of the research development process for this project, preliminary 
interviews are being undertaken with a small number of key informants. These 
will involve telephone interviews with senior DWP and Jobcentre Plus contract 
management staff. The interviews aim:
•	 To	consult	respondents	well-placed	to	comment	on	past	experience	in	
delivering services through private and not-for-profit organisations utilising 
forms of outcome based contracting.
•	 To	help	increase	the	research	team’s	awareness	of	recent	and	current	
developments in contracting and perceptions of the key issues, thus helping 
to maximise the relevance of subsequent fieldwork.
The interviews will follow a semi-structured format, maximising the opportunity 
for respondents to raise issues that they feel are important for the research 
project to understand and engage with.
 










participating at any point or chose not to answer particular questions.





for verbal agreement of consent (form to be emailed to respondent ahead of 
interview)
If asked what we mean by ‘complying with the Data Protection Act’ 
explain that we will:
keep all data in a secure environment;
allow only members of the research team (including administrators and 
transcribers) access to the data;
keep the data only as long as is necessary for the purposes of the research 
and then destroy it.
•	 Check	respondent	happy	to	start	the	recording	of	the	interview.
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1. Respondent background
1. What is your current job title and what responsibilities does your role 
involve?
2. How has your current/previous roles provided you with knowledge of 
outcome based contracting?
2. Previous experience of outcome based contracting 
1. What would you say are the distinguishing features of outcome based 
contracting?
2. Outcome based contracting can be described as a contracting approach 
that creates a set of incentives which aim to raise performance and 
provide value for money, whist encouraging innovation, flexibility and 
responsiveness to customers. Would you agree with this description?
 Probe:
 Why?/why not?
3. What previous experience does DWP/Jobcentre Plus have of delivering 












3. Outcome based contracting in Provider Led Pathways
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at a greater distance from the labour market.
•	 Potential	to	promote	innovation	amongst	providers.	Why?/why	not?
•	 Flexibility	to	address	a	shortfall	of	service	provision
•	 Competition	 amongst	 provider	 driving	 down	 costs	 and	 increasing	
performance over Jobcentre Plus outcomes
3.  What are the key issues for DWP contract managers in supporting the 
effective operation of PLP outcome based contracting?
4.  What are the key issues for Jobcentre Plus TPPMs in supporting the 
effective operation of PLP outcome based contracting?
5.  Are there any mechanisms to promote provider feedback on the operation 
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4. Reflective assessment
1.  Overall, how effectively do you feel that outcome based contracting is 
operating in Provider Led Pathways?
 Probe:
•	 Suggestions	for	improvement
2.  Are there lessons from previous experience of outcome based contracting 
in DWP or elsewhere that might be relevant for Provider Led Pathways?
3.  Do you have any (further) suggestions for issues that should be raised with 














Qualitative study exploring the influence of outcome  
based contracting in Provider-led Pathways to Work
Final Contract Manager Topic Guide
The purpose of the research
The aim of the research is to explore how outcome based contracting is 
operating within PL Pathways and how this is having an influence on the delivery 
of the programme and to explore this from numerous perspectives.
The purpose of the interviews
Interviews will take place with Contract Managers in two phase 1 areas and two 







The interviews will follow a semi-structured format, maximising the opportunity 
for respondents to raise issues that they feel are important for the research 
project to understand and engage with. 
The interviewer will distinguish between models of outcome based contracting 
and practice when interviewing.
Interviewer familiarisation should include: PLP provision specification, DWP 
Quality Framework, DWP Contract Management Framework )and key informant 
interview transcripts are also a source of useful background).
 
















for written agreement of consent (if interview taking place by telephone, form 
to be emailed to respondent ahead of interview to secure verbal agreement of 
consent)
If asked what we mean by ‘complying with the Data Protection Act’ 
explain that we will:
keep all data in a secure environment;
allow only members of the research team (including administrators and 
transcribers) access to the data;
keep the data only as long as is necessary for the purposes of the research 
and then destroy it.
•	 Check	respondent	happy	to	start	the	recording	of	the	interview.
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1. Respondent background
[COVER BUT DO NOT DWELL ON]












2. The nature of contracted provision & contract management & scrutiny 
1. What is [PROVIDER] contracted to deliver?





o Job outcomes (mandatory/voluntary)
o Sustained job outcomes (mandatory/voluntary)
•	 Prime	contractor	use	of	subcontractors	(extent,	which	ones)







3. Does outcome based contracting (in its current form) pose any significant 
risks for providers? 
















relating to labour market contexts in which Provider is trying to find jobs 
for client group.





topics and issues covered, usefulness of meetings
•	Whether	there	are	contract	reviews,	what	these	involve,	regularity	(and	
links to risk rating), circumstances in which contract review would give 
rise to a revision of targets
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7.  How useful have the principles embedded in the DWP Quality Framework 
been in managing the contract? 
Probe:
•	 Did	the	provider	complete	an	evaluative	Quality	Assessment	
Questionnaire at the start of the contract? If not, why not. If so, how 




weaknesses identified in Provider Development Plan(s)
•	 Any	suggestions	for	improvement	to	DWP	Quality	Framework
•	 How	useful	has	the	DWP	Contract	Management	Framework	been	in	
helping to manage the contract?
3. Working with harder to help groups
1. How are Jobcentre Plus processes helping to identify client needs?














minority groups (eg.ESOL needs), mental health conditions, particularly 
moderate to severe mental health conditions, moderate to severe 
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3.  How important to client progress is maintaining the present balance 
between mandatory and voluntary participation?




options has advantages/disadvantages for the PLP client group
4. Outcome based contracting can be described as a contracting approach 
that creates a set of incentives which aim to raise performance and 
provide value for money, whist encouraging innovation, flexibility and 
responsiveness to customers. Would you agree with this description?
Probe:
•	Why?/why	not?
5. There is evidence to suggest that outcome based contracting can have 
perverse effects on the support that Providers give to clients. To what extent 
does outcome based contracting promote disincentives for working with 





minority groups (eg.ESOL needs), mental health conditions, particularly 
moderate to severe mental health conditions, moderate to severe 
learning difficulties, disabled people (eg. Sensory impairments), ex-
offenders, care leavers.
•	 Any	signs	of	creaming	effects	(ie.	prioritised	working	with	more	job	
ready clients)? Why is/isn’t this happening? How do you know this?
•	 Any	signs	of	parking	effects	(ie.	where	harder	to	help	clients	receive	a	
bare minimum of service)? Why is/isn’t this happening? How do you 
know this?
•	 Does	MI	data	provide	you	with	the	scope	to	identify	any	unintended	
handling of clients/client selection? In what way(s)? How could this be 
improved?
•	 Any	signs	of	inappropriate	deferrals?	Why	is/isn’t	this	happening?	How	
do you know this?
•	 Are	FTAs	being	appropriately	followed	up?	How	are	these	monitored?
•	Whether	contracts	sufficiently	long?	Why/why	not?
6. To what extent does outcome based contracting promote innovation in 
working with PLP clients?





minority groups (eg.ESOL needs), mental health conditions, particularly 
moderate to severe mental health conditions, moderate to severe 





PEMs, Performance Improvement Workshop, DWP Provision Forum, 
provider integration into steering groups and committees.
•	 Any	constraints	on	innovation?	
o Financial costs of implementing ideas
o	 Incentives	&	structures	to	share	best	practice
o Whether contracts are sufficiently ‘open specification’ to promote/
encourage innovation, ie.. has the service delivery model been over 
specified? E.g. by stipulating 5 mandatory WFIs.
o Length of Provider contracts, e.g. whether long enough to promote 
shared risk
7. As a Contract Manager, to what extent are you able to help facilitate the 




relationships with provider, resources, support from other DWP roles/
teams, eg.WWEG Delivery
•	 Scope	for	Contract	Manager	to	influence	provider	actions	if	there	are	
problems in service delivery 
•	 Support	provided	for	Contract	Manager	role	by	Contract	Management	
Framework – suggestions for improvement
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4. Relationship with Provider






on relationship building in PLP Pathways
•	What	have	you	found	to	be	the	best	way	to	resolve	problems?
•	 How	effective	is	the	relationship	between	the	prime	and	subcontractor(s)
in this district? Do you have any contact with the subcontractors? Is this 
desirable? Is there untapped subcontractor potential in the district?
5. Relationship with Jobcentre Plus TPPM 
[DO NOT DWELL ON SECTION 5 IF PRESSED FOR TIME]
1. How does your role differ from that of a Third Party Provision Manager?
Probe:
•	 Are	the	boundaries	between	the	CM	and	TPPM	roles	clear?	(eg..	
responsibility for monitoring quality)
•	Why?	Why	not?
•	 Are	there	aspects	of	the	CM	role	that	would	be	better	placed	with	
the TPPM and vice versa? (eg.. aspects of contract compliance/quality 
monitoring)







Appendix – Topic guides
83
6. Reflective assessment
1.  Overall, how effectively do you feel that outcome based contracting is 





2.  One suggestion for improvement to the pricing structures of contracted 
out employment programmes is to move to an Escalator Funding Model. 
The idea is that Providers are paid lower outcome payments for more job 
ready clients and higher payments for less job ready clients. What do you 
think of this idea? 
 Probe:
•	 Views	on	need	for	greater	differentiation	of	outcomes	for	client	groups	
at a greater distance from the labour market (Advantages of this 
approach/disadvantages of this approach)
•	 Views	on	whether	there	should	be	a	requirement	that	particular	quotas	
of participants with greater needs are represented amongst outcomes
•	 Views	on	whether	specific	tenders	should	be	designed	targeted	
at particular hard to help groups (Advantages of this approach/
disadvantages of this approach)
•	 Views	on	whether	more	careful	regulation	of	referral	flows	would	help	
so that providers and their case managers have more incentive to work 
intensively with participants they already have rather than wait for 
other (more job ready) clients to arrive. (Advantages of this approach/
disadvantages of this approach)
3.  Do you have any (further) suggestions for issues that should be raised with 











Qualitative study exploring the influence of outcome based 
contracting in Provider-led Pathways to Work
Final Third Party Provision Manager Topic Guide
The purpose of the research
The aim of the research is to explore how outcome based contracting is 
operating within PL Pathways and how this is having an influence on the delivery 
of the programme and to explore this from numerous perspectives.
The purpose of the interviews
Interviews will take place with TPPMs in two phase 1 areas and two phase 2 







The interviews will follow a semi-structured format, maximising the opportunity 
for respondents to raise issues that they feel are important for the research 
project to understand and engage with. 
The interviewer will distinguish between models of outcome based contracting 
and practice when interviewing.
















for written agreement of consent (if interview taking place by telephone, form 
to be emailed to respondent ahead of interview to secure verbal agreement of 
consent)
If asked what we mean by ‘complying with the Data Protection Act’ 
explain that we will:
keep all data in a secure environment;
allow only members of the research team (including administrators and 
transcribers) access to the data;
keep the data only as long as is necessary for the purposes of the research 
and then destroy it.
•	 Check	respondent	happy	to	start	the	recording	of	the	interview.
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1. Respondent background
[COVER BUT DO NOT DWELL ON]
1. What is your current job title and what responsibilities does your role  
involve?
Probe:
1 Length of time in role
2 Nature of role 
3 Provider they have contact with (nb. All fieldwork takes place in single 
provider areas)
2. What proportion of their work is taken up with [NAME OF PROVIDER]?
Probe:
4 Relative importance of Performance Management and relationship 
building in role
2. The nature of contracted provision & contract management and 
scrutiny 






o Job outcomes (mandatory/voluntary)
o Sustained job outcomes (mandatory/voluntary)
•	 Prime	contractor	use	of	subcontractors	(extent,	which	ones)
[DO NOT DWELL ON 2.1 IF PRESSED FOR TIME]







3. Does outcome based contracting (in its current form) pose any significant 
risks for providers? 
















relating to labour market contexts in which Provider is trying to find jobs 
for client group.





topics and issues covered, usefulness of meetings
•	Whether	there	are	contract	reviews,	what	these	involve,	regularity,	
circumstances in which contract review would give rise to a revision of 
targets
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3. Working with harder to help groups









[DO NOT DWELL ON 3.1 IF PRESSED FOR TIME] 





minority groups (eg.ESOL needs), mental health conditions, particularly 
moderate to severe mental health conditions, moderate to severe 






3.  How important to client progress is maintaining the present balance 
between mandatory and voluntary participation?




options has advantages/disadvantages for the PLP client group
4. Outcome based contracting can be described as a contracting approach 
that creates a set of incentives which aim to raise performance and 
provide value for money, whist encouraging innovation, flexibility and 
responsiveness to customers. Would you agree with this description?
Probe:
Why?/why not?
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5.  There is evidence to suggest that outcome based contracting can have 
perverse effects on the support that Providers give to clients. To what 
extent does outcome based contracting promote disincentives for working 






minority groups (eg.ESOL needs), mental health conditions, particularly 
moderate to severe mental health conditions, moderate to severe 
learning difficulties, disabled people (eg. Sensory impairments), ex-
offenders, care leavers.
•	 Any	signs	of	creaming	effects	(ie.	prioritised	working	with	more	job	
ready clients)? Why is/isn’t this happening? How do you know this?
•	 Any	signs	of	parking	effects	(ie.	where	harder	to	help	clients	receive	a	
bare minimum of service)? Why is/isn’t this happening? How do you 
know this?
•	 Does	MI	data	provide	you	with	the	scope	to	identify	any	unintended	
handling of clients/client selection? In what way(s)? How could this be 
improved?
•	 Any	signs	of	inappropriate	deferrals?	Why	is/isn’t	this	happening?	How	
do you know this?
•	 Are	FTAs	being	appropriately	followed	up?	How	are	these	monitored?
•	Whether	contracts	sufficiently	long?	Why/why	not?
6. To what extent does outcome based contracting promote innovation in 




minority groups (eg. ESOL needs), mental health conditions, particularly 
moderate to severe mental health conditions, moderate to severe 





PEMs, Performance Improvement Workshop, DWP Provision Forum, 
provider integration into steering groups and committees.
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•	 Any	constraints	on	innovation?	
o Financial costs of implementing ideas
o	 Incentives	&	structures	to	share	best	practice
o Whether contracts are sufficiently ‘open specification’ to 
promote/encourage innovation, ie.. has the service delivery 
model been over specified? E.g. by stipulating 5 mandatory 
WFIs.
o Length of Provider contracts, e.g. whether long enough to 
promote shared risk
7. As a TPPM, to what extent are you able to help facilitate the kinds of 















provider and pertinent agencies/subcontractors
4. Relationship with Provider






this had any impact on relationship building
•	What	have	you	found	to	be	the	best	way	to	resolve	problems?
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Improvement activity
o Has the provider completed an evaluative Quality Assessment 
Questionnaire? If so, has this been reviewed, has a Provider 
Development Plan been developed and implemented?
•	 How	effective	is	the	relationship	between	the	prime	and	subcontractor	
in this district? Do you have any contact with the subcontractor(s)? Is this 
desirable? Is there untapped subcontractor potential in the district?
5. Relationship with DWP Contract Manager
[DO NOT DWELL ON SECTION 5 IF PRESSED FOR TIME]
1.  How does your role differ from that of a DWP Contract Manager?
Probe:
•	 Are	the	boundaries	between	the	CM	and	TPPM	roles	clear?	(eg..	




TPPM and vice versa? (eg.. aspects of quality monitoring)
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6. Reflective assessment
1.  Overall, how effectively do you feel that outcome based contracting is 





2.  Do you have any (further) suggestions for issues that should be raised with 












Qualitative study exploring the influence of outcome  
based contracting in Provider-led Pathways to Work
Prime Provider Topic Guide
The purpose of the research
The aim of the research is to explore how outcome based contracting is 
operating within PL Pathways, from the perspectives of different stakeholders, 
and how this influences delivery of the programme.
The purpose of the interviews
Interviews will take place with Prime Contractors in two phase 1 areas and two 









The interviews will follow a semi-structured format, maximising the opportunity 
for respondents to raise issues that they feel are important for the research 
project to understand and engage with. 
 











o Working with subcontracted providers/partners
o Working with harder to help groups







participating at any point or choose not to answer particular questions.
•	 Indicate	that	(as	mentioned	in	email/on	the	phone)	interview	will	last	 




for written agreement of consent.
If asked what we mean by ‘complying with the Data Protection Act’ 
explain that we will:
keep all data in a secure environment;
allow only members of the research team (including administrators and 
transcribers) access to the data;
keep the data only as long as is necessary for the purposes of the research 
and then destroy it.
•	 Check	respondent	happy	to	start	the	recording	of	the	interview.
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A. Respondent & Organisation background













B. Services and operations
3. Under your PLP contract with DWP, what do you deliver?
Probe:
•	 The	nature	of	services	under	the	current	contract (Establish internal 
provision as subcontracted/partner provision will be explored 
later. Also ask if they have any leaflets about provision that you 
can take away with you)
•	 The	outcome	measures/targets	that	are	set
o Job outcomes (mandatory/voluntary)
o Sustained job outcomes (mandatory/voluntary)
4. How has [Provider] approached staff recruitment?
(Nb. If recruitment is done centrally provider manager may not know 





staff rather than directly employing them?
•	 Staff	training?
•	 Have	there	been	any	problems	with	recruitment?	With	retention?	
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irrespective of range of clients in workloads (ie.. the mix of harder to 
help and easier to help) probe on outcome (eg job outcomes) and 














7. Can you describe your processes for:
•	 Deferring	clients?	In	what	circumstances	should/does	this	happen?
•	 Following	up	clients	who	have	been	referred	to	other	provision	(what	
happens if they do not attend)?
•	 Following	up	clients	after	a	course	of	provision	(e.g.	CMP)	finishes?	Any	
mechanism for monitoring progress? 
•	 Following	up	clients	at	the	end	of	the	5	mandatory	WFIs?
C. Contracting arrangements
8. What would be the business case for entering into an outcomes- 






whether expect this will generate further problems down the line
•	 Views	on	setting	outcome	targets
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•	Whether	provider	feels	valued.

















11. [If not already raised] What impacts, if any, has the weakened 
economy had on your ability to fulfil the contract agreement?







topics and issues covered, usefulness of meetings
•	 Opportunities	to	feed	back	on	experiences	&	issues,	eg
o Quality Assessment Questionnaire?
o Provider Development Plan been developed and implemented? Has 
anything been changed as a consequence?
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o Contract monitoring (e.g., any concerns about being monitored 
against starts given ATOS delays)





•	 (If hold more than one DWP contract) whether would be advantages in 
having one contract to cover all programmes they are delivering
D. Working with subcontracted providers/partners
14. Which, if any, subcontractors do you work with to help deliver these 
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16. Do you also signpost to other (non-contracted) service provision to 






why a SLA rather than a subcontract?
•	 Any	monitoring	of	client	experience/progress	on	this	provision.	How	
monitored?
17. Do you feel you have enough information about the services 
potentially available in the area?
•	 Are	they	adequate	for	this	client	group?	Any	gaps?






E. Working with harder to help groups
19. How well do you think your organisation (and partner providers) is 





groups (eg. ESOL needs), mental health conditions, particularly moderate 
to severe mental health conditions, moderate to severe learning difficulties, 
disabled people (eg. sensory impairments), ex-offenders, care leavers.
•	 How	do	you	classify	client	needs?	Is	the	initial	action	plan	drawn	up	by	
IBPAs used for this? Why/why not? Role/usefulness of WFHRAs
•	 Ease	of	identifying	how	hard	to	help	a	client	is.	Where	challenges	are	
identified, what are the implications?
20. What is the present balance between mandatory and voluntary 
clients using your services?
•	What	do	you	think	about	this?
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21. In your opinion, does outcome based contracting promote incentives 




Ask for examples. What are the advantages this? Are there any 
disadvantages? Are some clients getting a bare minimum of service? 
Which ones? Is any guidance given to front-line advisers on prioritisation 
of clients? In what way(s)?
•	 Have	you	seen	or	experienced	creaming	practices,	which	prioritise	work	
with more job ready clients? Ask for examples
•	 Is	there	a	role	for	these	practices	in	delivering	your	PLP	services?	Why?	
Why not? Any guidance provided to advisers on this?
•	 (If respondent feels that these practices are problematic) How can you 
guard against this?
•	 Any	resource	constraints	on	supporting	some	clients?	Which	ones?	
Extent to which working with subcontractors/partners helps overcome 
any constraints.
F. Relationships with Contract Management, Jobcentre Plus and other 
providers
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whether this had bearing on current relationship
•	 Sharing	of	practices
G. Reflective assessment
24. One suggestion for improvement to the pricing structures of 
contracted provision is to move to an Escalator Funding Model. The idea 
is that providers are paid lower outcome payments for more job ready 
clients and higher payments for less job ready clients. What do you think 
of this idea?
Probe for views on:
•	 greater	differentiation	of	outcomes	for	clients	at	different	‘distances’	




with participants they already have rather than wait for other (more job 
ready) clients)
25. To what extent do you think that outcome based contracts promote 




26. Is there anything else you would like to add or comment on that we 
haven’t already covered?
Thank you very much for your time.
Remind respondent of confidentiality/anonymity and ensure that they are  
happy to be quoted.
Ask for contact details of Pathways  
subcontractors/partners we could interview as part  
of this study.




Qualitative study exploring the influence of outcome  
based contracting in Provider-led Pathways to Work
Provider Adviser Topic Guide
The purpose of the research
The aim of the research is to explore how outcome based contracting is 
operating within PL Pathways, from the perspectives of different stakeholders, 
and how this influences delivery of the programme.
The purpose of the interviews
Interviews will take place with Prime Contractors in two phase 1 areas and two 






The interviews will follow a semi-structured format, maximising the opportunity 
for respondents to raise issues that they feel are important for the research 
project to understand and engage with. 
 







o Respondent role and organisation background.
o Service delivery.
o Working with subcontracted providers.
o Experience of working with different client groups – To help you 
explore your experience, I will be drawing on ‘hypothetical’ 
examples of client & adviser experiences. 





participating at any point or chose not to answer particular questions.
•	 Indicate	that	(as	mentioned	in	email/on	the	phone)	interview	will	last	 
up to 75 minutes – and check that respondent is ok for time.
•	 Explain	purpose	of	tape-recording	(ask	permission),	transcription,	nature	of	
reporting.
Check whether respondent has any questions and is happy to proceed – ask 
for written agreement of consent 
If asked what we mean by ‘complying with the Data Protection Act’ explain 
that we will:
keep all data in a secure environment;
allow only members of the research team (including administrators and 
transcribers) access to the data;
keep the data only as long as is necessary for the purposes of the research and 
then destroy it.
•	 Check	respondent	happy	to	start	the	recording	of	the	interview.
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A. Respondent & Organisation background







(nb: client characteristics to be probed on in more depth in section D)
B. Service delivery









3. How do you decide to refer a client to the internal and/or external 




4. What contact do you have with clients:
- once they take up a referral (e.g., CMP, go to another provider)?






Appendix – Topic guides
105
5. What happens in the process:
- if a client does not take up a referral?
- after a mandatory client completes all 5 WFIs?
- after a client completes provision that been referred to?


















8. How is your work with Pathways clients monitored?
Probe:
•	 Use	of	targets?
o are these the same for all types of clients (e.g., harder to help?)
o probe on outcome (eg job outcomes) and process targets (eg no of 
WFIs a day, referrals to provision)
o what do you think of the targets? What is working well? How 
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10. [If not already raised] What impacts, if any, has the weakened economy 
had on your ability to fulfill targets?
11. What feedback have you had from clients about your services?
Probe:
•	 Formal	mechanisms	for	feedback/informal	feedback
C. Working with subcontracted providers/partners
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15. What feedback have you had from clients about their experiences 
with these other providers?
D. Experience of different client groups
16. Can you describe the types of barriers to work that your clients have?













19. Next, I’d like to give you some fictional scenarios about clients and 
I’d like you to say what course of action you would take with each client 
Vignette 1:
“Marvin is 35 with bipolar disorder. He was previously employed as a sales 
assistant at DIY retail store but dropped out of work due to bullying from work 
colleagues which aggravated his condition. He has been unemployed for the last 
two years. He wants to work but needs to get his condition under control first. 
He is very nervous about coming in to see the personal adviser because of his 
experiences of bullying at work and he also very unsure about himself. Marvin is 
currently on IB and has 10 years retail experience but is unsure about returning 
to work in retail due to his recent experience”.
Questions:
i. What would be your first step with Marvin?
ii. Are you able to help him with managing his condition?
iii. Would you encourage him back into retail work despite his 
concerns? Why, why not?
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“You are at your initial meeting with Marvin and you are halfway through him 
telling you about why his condition worsened in his last job. He is very nervous 
and aware of disclosing his information to new people. A client comes into the 
office unexpectedly to tell you that they have been offered a job and requires 20 
minutes of your undivided attention”.
Questions:
i. Do you leave Marvin by himself at your desk or do you leave 
your job ready client to wait?
ii. Do you risk not providing timely support to the client with the 
job offer or losing the trust of a new client?
iii. Have you or one of your colleagues had a similar experience 
What happened? Why? How do you feel about this? How 
typical/exceptional is this kind of experience?
Vignette 2:
“Julie is a voluntary client with severe learning difficulties who has asked 
Provider-led Pathways to help her into work. She desperately wants to work and 
has been put forward for several jobs but her appearance and inter-personal skills 
seem to be contributing to her lack of success at interviews. Julie often visits the 
provider’s office without an appointment and is becoming dependent on her. The 
adviser is struggling with targets and feels that the chance of Julie getting into 
work is slim, particularly as there have been lots of job losses in the area recently.
Questions:
i. What should the adviser do? What impact will this action have 
on Julie, the adviser, others?
ii. Have you or one of your colleagues had a similar experience 
What happened? Why? How do you feel about this? How 
typical/exceptional is this kind of experience?
20. How well do you think your organisation (with other providers) is 




groups (eg. ESOL needs), mental health conditions, particularly moderate 
to severe mental health conditions, moderate to severe learning difficulties, 
disabled people (eg. sensory impairments), ex-offenders, care leavers.
•	 Voluntary	clients
•	 For	mandatory	clients,	does	the	current	balance	of	mandatory	and	
voluntary participation work well? What could be improved?
•	What	is	working	well	in	terms	of	in	work	support	and	job	retention?	
What could be improved?
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22. In your opinion, do outcome targets (eg job entry targets) promote 





clients receive a bare minimum of service? Ask for examples.
•	 If	you	cannot	help	clients	any	further,	do	you	refer	them	onto	other	
support? If yes, where to (examples) if not, why not.
•	 Have	you	seen	or	experienced	creaming	practices,	which	prioritise	work	
with more job ready clients? Ask for examples
•	 Is	there	a	role	for	these	practices	in	delivering	your	PLP	services?	Why?	




23. One suggestion for improvement to contracted employment 
programmes such as Pathways to Work is to move to an Escalator 
Funding Model. The idea is that providers are paid lower outcome 
payments for more job ready clients and higher payments for less job 






24. Is there anything else you would like to add or comment on that we 
haven’t already covered?
Thank you very much for your time.
Remind interviewee of confidentiality/anonymity of contribution and 
ensure that interviewee is happy to be quoted.





Qualitative study exploring the influence of outcome  
based contracting in Provider-led Pathways to Work
Subcontractor/partner Topic Guide
The purpose of the research
The aim of the research is to explore how outcome based contracting is 
operating within PL Pathways, from the perspectives of different stakeholders, 
and how this influences delivery of the programme.
The purpose of the interviews
Telephone interviews will take place with Subcontractors and partners in two 







The interviews will follow a semi-structured format, maximising the opportunity 
for respondents to raise issues that they feel are important for the research 
project to understand and engage with. 
 



















participating at any point or choose not to answer particular questions.
•	 Indicate	that	(as	mentioned	in	email/on	the	phone)	interview	will	last	 




– ask for verbal consent (as interview is to be taking place by telephone, 
form to be emailed to respondent ahead of interview to facilitate secure 
verbal agreement of consent)
If asked what we mean by ‘complying with the Data Protection Act’ 
explain that we will:
keep all data in a secure environment;
allow only members of the research team (including administrators and 
transcribers) access to the data;
keep the data only as long as is necessary for the purposes of the research 
and then destroy it.
•	 Check	respondent	happy	to	start	the	recording	of	the	interview.
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A. Respondent & Organisation background














B. Services and operations















o Sustained job outcomes
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Ask respondents with contracts or SLAs







6. How do you supervise, support and monitor your frontline staff who  















Ask all who have targets
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9. What feedback have you had from frontline staff about their 















12. What are the implications of your relationship with the prime 



















services they are delivering
•	 Any	delays	in	payment	&	impact	of	this
13. [If not already raised] What impacts, if any, has the weakened economy 
had on your ability to fulfil your contract/service level agreement/spirit 
of your partnership?
Ask all respondents with contracts/SLAs














D. Working with harder to help groups
16. How well do you think your organisation (and partner providers) 
is able to address the range of Pathways clients’ needs? (if appropriate – 




groups (eg. ESOL needs), mental health conditions, particularly moderate 
to severe mental health conditions, moderate to severe learning 
difficulties, disabled people (eg. sensory impairments), ex-offenders, care 
leavers.
•	 Do	you/how	do	you	classify	client	needs?
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17. What is the present balance between mandatory and voluntary 
clients using your services? (may not be aware of this)
•	What	do	you	think	about	this?
18. In your opinion, does outcome based contracting promote incentives 







E. Relationships with other prime providers and Jobcentre Plus










21. What contact do you have with Pathways Prime providers/
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F. Reflective assessment
22. One suggestion for improvement to the pricing structures of 
contracted provision is to move to an Escalator Funding Model. The idea 
is that providers are paid lower outcome payments for more job ready 
clients and higher payments for less job ready clients. What do you think 
of this idea?
Probe for views on:
•	 greater	differentiation	of	outcomes	for	clients	at	different	‘distances’	
from the labour market 
•	 outcome	quotas	for	participants	with	greater	needs/harder	to	help
•	 tenders	designed	to	target	particular	‘hard	to	help’	groups
23. To what extent do you think that outcome based contracts promote 




24. Is there anything else you would like to add or comment on that we 
haven’t already covered?
Thank you very much for your time.
Remind respondent of confidentiality/anonymity and ensure that they are  
happy to be quoted.
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